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CHAPTER I 
THE ORIGIN OF THE OREGON QUESTION
The Oregon boundary question presents to the student of history 
an interesting phase of Anglo-American relations: it is simplej illusive 
and complex all at the same time. During the period of dispute both 
Great Britain and the United States resorted to almost every diplomatic 
device available to their governments to attain their immediate goals 
in the northwestern territory. Both countries resorted to exaggerated 
land claims, secrecy, belligerency, bluster and the outright threat of 
war. Yet the final solution proved to be a satisfactory compromise 
based on the forty-ninth parallel, a boundary line that was proposed 
by both sides on numerous occasions during the two decades prior to the 
settlement of the controversy in I8I46.
It is necessary at the onset to clarify the term Oregon as it 
was used by the disputants. The term Oregon, in the Oregon question, 
changed meanings from the middle of the eighteenth century to the middle 
of the nineteenth century. When used by the early Indians the term 
"originally referred to the Golumbia-Snake jRiver] System."^ By the 
early eighteen hundreds the disputants generally referred to the Oregon 
country as the "lands lying between the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific 
Ocean and extending northward indefinitely from the forty-second parallel
iVernon Snow, "From Ouragan to Oregon," Oregon Historical Quar­
terly, EX (1959), pp. hhO-kl■>
2of latitude»" By l82L, definite boundaries for the Oregon territory 
were established as a result of treaties signed by the United States 
with Spain and Russia» The boundaries of the territory included all 
lands from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Ocean between the ii2° and 
the 5%°L0' parallels. The actual area in dispute between Great Britain 
and the United States was the region lying north of the Columbia River 
and south of the li9° parallel between the Rocky Mountains and the Paci­
fic Ocean. This triangular area, consisting of 360,000 square miles, 
proved to be the basis for the Oregon dispute.
During the course of the conflict over Oregon, which lasted from 
l8l5 until 1816, two differing viewpoints were put to a severe test.
The United States as a young and fast growing republic was passing 
through a phase of territorial expansion called Manifest Destiny. For 
this reason the United States was not only somewhat jealous of Great 
Britain, but strongly suspicious of British motives in the northwestern 
territory. The idea of sovereignty had become an inherent part of the 
American way of life based to a large extent upon the example that Great 
Britain had set for the young republic many years before, when Britain 
was attempting to consolidate her holdings in the New World. Dorothy 
Johansen very aptly summarizes the American position, "The new nation 
inherited from its colonial experience a continental viewpoint. British 
imperialism of the mid-eighteenth century had required the expulsion of 
the French Empire from North America. The United States’ imperialism 
now required, at most the elimination of the British Empire or at least
 ̂Hubert Bancroft, History of Oregon (San Francisco, l886) XXIX, 
p. 1» (Hereafter cited as Bancroft, History of Oregon XXIX)»
3its containment." Great Britain and all other foreign powers posed a 
serious threat to American expansion, growth and security on the con- 
tinent.
The American attitude of distrust and suspicion was difficult 
for the British government to comprehend. Even though Great Britain 
possessed the most powerful navy on the high seas, the British at no 
time during the Oregon controversy demonstrated a desire to colonize 
permanently the disputed territory, nor did they desire to precipitate 
a crisis by attempting to push the Americans out of Oregon. Britain’s 
only desire was that the Oregon country be left open so that she might 
use it as a base for the Hudson's Bay Company to secure furs and as a 
commercial outlet across the continent for carrying on her lucrative 
far eastern trade. By the early nineteenth century Britain began to 
realize that colonies and possessions that were taken simply for terri- 
torial aggrandizement were very seldom profitable enterprises. There- 
fore, the British, who preferred no new colonies and who were interested 
primarily in pursuing a free trade policy, were often offended and 
deeply insulted by the attitude and actions of the United States dur­
ing the Oregon controversy. These two conflicting viewpoints, the 
American desire for growth and territorial acquisition and the British 
desire to pursue their free trade policies without the threat of intim- 
idation from the United States, may very well form the basis for the 
Oregon controversy, a controversy that was to eventually force two 
major powers (Spain and Russia) to relinquish their claims in the
^Dorothy 0. Johansen and Charles Gates, Empire of the Columbia
A History of the Northwest (New York, 1957), p. iB?.
l4
northwest and almost cause Great Britain and the United States to engage 
in a third war.
In the early nineteenth century four powers--England, the United 
States, Spain and Russia— claimed portions of the Oregon territory. As 
was often the case, many of these claims overlapped and conflicted with 
each other; these conflicting claims contributed quite naturally to much 
of the controversy that surrounded the territory. To all outward appear­
ances, Great Britain and the United States seemed to have valid claims 
to the territory, although with the passage of years, as the controversy 
became more heated, each country tended to exaggerate its own claims to 
a large extent and belittle the claims of the other. Spain and Russia, 
though possessing legitimate claims to the area, did not press them 
with the same vigor. One thing that the four powers had in common was 
that none of them realized the true value of the Oregon territory.
In order to understand the Oregon dispute one must first become 
familiar with the early claims and actions of the powers involved. The 
first country to lay claim to Oregon was Spain. The Spanish based 
their claim to Oregon on the early exploration of Balboa, who crossed 
the Isthmus of Panama in 1^13 and claimed all of the lands that bor­
dered the Pacific Ocean to be the property of Spain. In l602, Lt.
Aquilar sailed as far north as the 1̂ 3° parallel claiming the lands for 
Spain. In 177h, two Spanish seamen named Pefez and Martinez sailed as 
far north as the 55° parallel. The following year a Spanish squadron 
of ships under the command of Hecata, Ayala and Quadra explored the 
coast from the 27° parallel up to the 58° parallel. These early Spanish
^High L. Keenleyside, Canada and the United States Some Aspects 
of Their Historical RelationsTHew~Iork, 1952) , p. 155»
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explorations, which led to the establishment of a few isolated Spanish 
posts in the area, formed the basis of all Spanish claims in Oregon.
In I7I4I, Vitus Bering, sailing for Russia, discovered Alaska and 
also explored many of the islands in the Bering Sea. His discoveries 
made possible the creation in 1799 of the Russlan-American Company, to 
take advantage of the fur trade in America. The Company's headquarters 
were at Sitka. As the Russian interest in furs expanded, so did their 
company posts along the coast of western America. It is often not 
realized the extent to which the Russians built fur posts along the 
west coast; as early as I816 the Russians built Fort Ross at Bodega 
Bay, just north of San Francisco. For the most part all of the Rua- 
sian claims to Oregon were based upon the exploration of Vitus Bering 
and upon the Russian settlements established in the area.
Even though Spain and Russia had legitimate claims to the terri- 
tory, they were not as impressive as those of the United States and 
Great Britain. The United States had a logical base for its claims to 
Oregon. These included the exploration of Captain Robert Gray, who 
discovered and explored the lands adjacent to the mouth of the Columbia 
River in 1792; the overland journey of Lewis and Clark from St. Louis 
to the Pacific and back between l80lt and I8O6; and, finally, upon the 
building of Astoria near the Columbia River in I8II by the American Fur 
Company. These early American claims to the territory were later elab­
orated upon and made much more complex in an attempt to prove their 
validity.
^Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States 
(New York, 19L2), p. 20^.
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British claims, like the American claims, rested largely upon 
early exploration» The British claimed that Captain James Cook first 
sailed off the coast of Oregon as early as 1778» Also, as early as 
1793, Alexander Mackenzie crossed the continent and ascended part of 
the Fraser River. The Hudson's Bay Company, of course, had been engaged 
in active trading in the Oregon territory— as defined by the British—  
at the turn of the century even though the first British settlement.
Fort McLeod, was not built in the interior until 1805’.̂  The British, 
very much like their American cousins, later added other reasons as 
proof of their claims, but by iBlO these were basically the claims of 
the four powers involved in Oregon.
To most contemporaries it seemed inevitable that Great Britain 
with her powerful navy and the United States because of its close prox­
imity to the territory would soon attempt to force Spain and Russia out 
of the disputed territory. For the most part, early negotiations be­
tween the United States and Britain were handled as though these two 
countries were the only powers with a vital interest in the area and 
Spain and Russia were seldom consulted.
The first major dispute to occur over the Oregon territory in- 
volved Spain and Great Britain. The Spanish, who were still pursuing 
a rather obsolete mercantilistic course in the Americas, became quite 
concerned about the number of British in the territory so they decided 
to reaffirm their right of exclusive sovereignty in Oregon. In order 
to accomplish this in a convincing manner, Don Màrtinez, the commander
^Richard B. Morris, Encyclopedia of American History (New York, 
L9S3), p. 88.
of a Spanish force took formal possession of a small British post at 
Nootka Sound on June 2b, 1789. "Harsh treatment of British traders and 
forcible seizure by Don tbrtlnez," wrote Schafer, . . of several 
British owned vessels at Nootka precipitated the quarrel which at one
7time seemed to foreshadow war." The situation that developed as a 
result of this Spanish action caused Great Britain to demand equal 
privileges in Oregon and compensation for the damage caused by the 
Spanish. Before yielding to the British demands, Spain sought support 
from France, but when the Spanish became convinced that they would re­
ceive no support from Britain's traditional eneiiy, they yielded to the 
English demands. In 1790, Great Britain and Spain reached an agreement 
when the Nootka Convention was agreed on between the two parties. "In 
it Spain conceded the right of British subjects to trade and make set­
tlements upon any part of the coast not already occupied. In other 
words, Spain gave up her exclusive claim so far as the coast above 
California was concerned."^ Spain was also required to pay Britain a 
small indemnity besides granting equal rights to all Englishmen north 
of the 38° parallel. The Nootka Convention was the first step in the 
removal of Spain from contention in Oregon. For their part, the British 
government had no desire to colonize the area. What they really wanted 
was to prevent any one country from acquiring exclusive control in the 
region.
The first major disagreement between Great Britain and the United
^Joseph Schafer, A History of the Pacific Northwest (New York, 
19$l); p. 18. (Hereafter cited as Schafer, The Pacific Northwest).
^Ibld., p. 19.
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States with regard to the Oregon territory stemmed from the British 
seizure of Astoria during the War of l8l2. Fearing that the British 
would take Astoria, the American Fur Company's post on the Columbia 
River, Duncan IMcDougal, a partner in the company, sold the post to the 
British Northwest Company for $80,5G0. Other members of the company 
who felt thqy had been betrayed by McDougnl later estimated the true 
value of Astoria at $1,000,000. Oddly enough, shortly after selling
Astoria to the Northwest Company, McDougal soon became a partner in
0that organization. Even though he was accused of betraying the inter­
ests of the American Fur Company, he evidently had some foresight, how­
ever, for within two months after the sale the British twenty-six gun 
warship Racoon, under the command of Captain Black, officially captured 
Astoria.
After the War of 1812, John Jacob Astor urged the United States 
government not to let the British keep Astoria. During the negotiations 
that took place at Ghent the Americans, keeping Astoria in mind, suc­
ceeded in inserting into the treaty a clause that in general terms 
stated, "All territory, places, and possessions whatsoever, taken by 
either par^r from the other during the war, . . .[should] be restored 
without delay. . . The British negotiators saw no objection to
the statement as they well knew that Astoria had been purchased by the 
Northwest Company and in their opinion had not been captured.
The first formal opening of the Oregpn question came in July of
^James W, Bashford, The Oregon Missions The Story of How the 
Dine Whs Run Between Canada and the United States (New York, 1918),pT3o.
^^Schafer, The Pacific Northwest» p. 90«
9
l8l5, when Secretary of State James Monroe called to the attention of 
British Ambassador Baker the fact that an expedition had been sent by 
the British government "against a post of the United States, established 
on the Columbia River, ^and^ had succeeded in taking possession of It."^^ 
At the same time the British were Informed that the United States planned 
to reoccupy Astoria In accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Ghent. 
The British protested, saying that Astoria would not be included as a 
post taken by force during the war according to the terms of the treaty.
The lUnlted States refused to recognize the British position and 
began to make plans to retake the post. After nearly two years of delay 
a delegation was finally sent to Astoria to officially retake the post. 
Captain Biddle was sent on the American ship Ontario to peacefully re­
store Astoria to the United States. Biddle accomplished this task with 
no opposition from either the British navy or the Northwest Company.
Even though the British protested agplnst the way the Americans 
effected the restoration of Astoria, "Lord Castlereagh, British Foreign 
Secretary, found reasons of pollqy for conceding the right of the United
States to be placed In possession of Astoria under the Treaty of Ghent,
12although he refused to concede the American right to the territory."
It would appear that the British government regarded the restoration of 
Astoria to the United States as a type of recognition of the American 
claims to land south of the Columbia River, but nothing more. In restor­
ing Astoria, as he did, Castlereagh did not lack critics. George Canning,
James S. Reeves, American Diplomacy Under Tyler and Polk (Balti­
more, 1907), p. 209. (Hereafter cited as Reeves, American Diplomacy).
^^Schafer, The P a c if ic  Northwest, p. 91.
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who was erentaally to become Castlereagh's successor in the Foreign 
Office, felt that the restoration of Astoria was a terrible blunder, and 
he feared that it would be "bqt the first symptom of weakness, the first 
of a series of compliances with encroachments which, if not resisted, 
will grow upon success." In retrospect, one must readily acknowledge 
that Canning displayed a great deal of foresight when he criticized his 
government's capitulation. Canning may well have been one step ahead 
of the firm believers in Manifest Destiny, a term that was not to be 
coined for another thirty years.
The next opportunity that representatives of the United States 
and Great Britain had to seriously discuss the Oregon territory came in 
October of I818, when Albert Gallatin and Richard Rush began negotia­
tions with the President of the Board of Trade Robinson and under­
secretary of State Goulburn in london. The purpose of the negotiation 
was to try to establish a boundary line between Canada and the United 
States from the lake of the Woods westward. During the course of the 
discussions the British representatives pressed for recognition of their 
territory as far south as the Columbia River; but the American negotia­
tors had previously been instructed not to accept any offers that would 
recognize British sovereignty below the parallel in the northwest. 
Because no progress could be made on the Oregon question, it was finally 
agreed, although reluctantly on the part of the British, that both coun­
tries would have equal rights and privileges in the territory for a 
period of ten years.
13Julius Wra. Pra+t, A Histopy of United States Foreign Policy 
(Englewood Cliffs, Mew Jarsey, p. Thereafter cited as
Pratt, U^ Foreign Policy).
Daring the next few years the Oregon territory presented no par­
ticular problems between Great Britain and the United States. It was 
daring this period, however, that both Russia and Spain were eliminated 
from contention as far as their claims or rights in Oregon were con­
cerned. On October 31, l8l9, as part of the Adams-Onis Treaty the 
United States obtained from Spain a renunciation of all claims and 
rights to aqy land west of the Rocky Mountains and north of the L2° 
parallel— territory that Spain had previously claimed. This effect­
ively established a definite southern boundary for the Oregon territory 
and eliminated Spain from having any other claims in the area.
On September b, 1821, the Russian Czar issued a ukase, which 
forbade aqy countries other than Russia from trading or coming within 
one-hundred miles of the west coast between the Bering Straits and as 
far south as the parallel. This decree when it became known to the 
British and American governments on February 11, 1822, was not well re­
ceived, as it was considered to be incompatible with the interests of 
both countries. Both felt that Russia had no right to attempt to re­
strict or limit foreign trade in the northwest. Even though there was 
a definite lack of cooperation between the United States and Great 
Britain in trying to override the Russian ukase, evidence would seem 
to indicate that both John Quinpy Adams and George Canning were already 
quite apprehensive about Russian expansion on the west coast. Even 
though both men were uneasy about a possible Russian encroachment Can­
ning refnsed to participate with the United States and Russia in nego­
tiations at St. Petersburg to determine a northern boundary On
January 9, l82b, he informed Richard Rush in London that, "The resump- 
tion of its original course by this Government [Great Britain] has
12
arisen chiefly from the principle which cnr government has adopted, of 
not considering the American continents as subject to fhture coloniza­
tion by any of the European powers a principle to which Great Britain
T Idoes not accede." This, naturally enough, was Canning's answer to 
the recent Monroe Doctrine and its "no future colonization" clause. 
Canning did indicate that he would have been willing to negotiate 
jointly Russia's claims over their rights on the sea off the coast, but 
he refused to consider a joint boundary negotiation.
Canning would have been exceedingly interested in a letter sent 
by John Quinpy Adams to American Ambassador Middleton in St. Petersburg 
on Ju%y 22, 1823. Excerpts from this letter indicate the basic position 
of the United States in regard to the disputed areas
The right of the United States from the forty-second to the 
forty-ninth parallel of latitude on the Pacific Ocean we con­
sider as unquestionable. This territory is to the United 
States of an importance which no possession in North America 
can be of to any European nation, not only as it is but the 
continuity of their possessions from the Atlantic to the Paci­
fic Ocean, but as it offers their inhabitants the means of 
establishing here-after communications from the one to the 
other.
By offering free and equal access for a term of years to 
navigation and intercourse with the natives of Russia, within 
the limits to which our claims are indisputable, we concede 
much more than we obtain.
Although Russia did not pose as serious a threat to American claims in
Oregon, the American position was being made perfectly clear for the
benefit of any, including Great Britain, who might have some doubts.
As the United States Minister in St. Petersburg began to prepare
l^Reeves, American Diplomacy, p. 23b. (Quoted from Rush to 
Middleton, Jan. 9, lB2bs American State Papers, Foreign Relations, 7, b63). _______
^^Ibid., p. 227.
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a vigorous protest agoinst the ukase, he was quietly informed that no 
protest would be necessary as "The Emperor has already had the good 
sense to see that this affair should not be pushed too far."^^^ This 
complete volte-face on the part of the Russian government made it pos- 
sible in l82b for a treaty to be agreed upon and signed between the 
United States and Russia. According to the terms of the agreement 
neither country would push their trade activities in areas conceded to 
the other, nor would the United States make any claims north of the 
LO' parallel. The following year Great Britain signed a similar treaty 
with Russia recognizing the same boundary of LO* and including the 
same general conditions.
As a result of these two separate treaties with Russia, Great 
Britain and the United States emerged as the only claimants to the 
Oregpn territory between the ^2° and the bO' parallels. Thus, the
stage was set l82b for these two powers to begin the contest over 
the Oregpn territory, which was to last for twenty-two years and bring 
both countries to the brink of war on several occasions.
From the proposals and counterproposals made by the two govern­
ments in the ensuing years the intent of each party became relatively 
clear: Great Britain bad no intention of colonizing the country but 
wished to maintain her territorial rights there, while the United States 
apparently would someday colonize the area and definitely felt that she 
had exclusive rights as far north as the parallel. Actually the
British had better claims to the lands north of the Columbia River,
l^Samuel Flagg Bemis, The American Secretaries of State and Their 
Lomacy (New York, 1928), IF, 9^.
lit
while the Americans had better claims to the land south of the river.
The negotiations that ensued followed the usual diplomatic pattern in 
that the foreign secretaries of both countries generally claimed all of 
the land area in dispute between the 1*2° and the $1*° 1*0’ parallels, but 
consistently talked of compromise around the 1*9° parallel.
During the period following the Convention of l8l8, one man more
than any other was to set the pattern of the Oregon negotiations. George
Canning who "was hot with resentment over the Monroe message of December
1823; was annoyed by the agitation in Congress over the Oregon issue, „ .
. detested the republicanism of the United States; was utterly and openly
contemptuous of its democracy; [and] thought its government tricky,
was to establish the basis of British policy in Oregon. This policy was
such that it made a settlement of the problem virtually impossible until
l8L6. Foreign Secretary Canning’s basic policy was presented to Richard
Rush in l82l*, when Rush was trying to secure a settlement along the 1*9°
parallel in compliance with instructions from John Quincy Adams. In
his dispatch dated May 31, l82l*, to the British commissioners who were
negotiating with Rush, Canning stated that Britain had;
. . .  An equal right with the United States and all other powers, 
to make use of the entire territory from the 1*2° to $1*° 1*0’. A 
willingness to agree on a division of the territory with the 
United States, then the only power aside from Britain which had 
real interests there, on the joint principles of occupancy and 
reciprocal convenience. Britain would not give up any part of 
the Nootka Sound.
Britain would not give up the Columbia, the only navigable 
communication, hitherto ascertained to ecist, with the interior 
of that part of the country.
17prederick Merk, Albert Gallatin and the Oregon Problem (Cam­
bridge, 1950, p. 55. (Hereafter cited as“¥irk, Gaïlatin and the Oregon 
Problem). --- - - ---- --------
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The Amerioans are claiming under a French title, a Spanish 
title, and an American title, and they are supplying the de- 
ficiencies of each one of these titles by arguments drawn 
from the others. This could not be permitted. They might 
select the title they deemed best, and stand upon that, but 
must not attempt to use all three at the same time.l"
Canning simply refused to consider any relinquishment of land 
north of the Columbia River. Yet, the United States accordingly refused 
to consider anything less than the ii9® parallel. From I82I4 on this 
triangular area between the Rocky Mountains, the Columbia River and the 
li9° parallel was the only land area in actual dispute. British claims 
to the land north of the l9° parallel were generally recognized by the 
United States as were the American claims south of the Columbia River.
In April, 1826, the English Foreign Minister suggested that negotiations 
on the Oregon territory be resumed in London, as the ten^year limit in 
the Convention of I818 was about to expire. Albert Gallatin was sent 
to Great Britain by President John Adams to negotiate with the British. 
Before leaving the United States, Gallatin received instructions to 
propose the parallel as a compromise line and to accept nothing 
less than this same line.
However, Canning once again proposed that the territory be divided 
on the Columbia River, a proposal which Gallatin was expressly instructed 
not to accept or even discuss. It soon became apparent that no new 
agreement could be reached, so after prolonged debate the negotiators 
finally agreed to extend the period of joint occupation indefinitely, 
giving both countries the same equal rights and privileges in the terri­
tory that they had formerly possessed under the terms of the Convention
^^Schafer, The Pacific Northwest, p. 102,
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of 1818. Because no definite date was determined for this new agree­
ment to expire both countries had the authority to terminate the joint 
occupation by giving notice to the other party one year in advance of 
their intention to do so.
Secretary Canning apparently felt that he could not make any 
concessions in Oregon that would not harm what he envisioned as a lucra­
tive British trade. In a letter to Lord Liverpool, written on July 7, 
1826j he said that,
. . .  the trade between the Eastern and Western Hemisphere direct 
across the Pacific  ̂ is the trade of the world most susceptible 
of rapid augmentation and improvement. . . .  I should not like 
to leave my name affixed to an instrument by which England would 
have foregone the advantages of an immense direct intercourse 
between Canada and what may be, if we resolve not to yield them, _ 
up, her boundless establishments on the N. W. Coast of America.^"
Canning felt that the restoration of Astoria had been a blunder and
that any concession on his part to the United States would only lead to
more demands| therefore, he seemed willing to accept the principle of
joint occupation indefinitely.
On the other hand, Albert Gallatin saw the continuation of the 
joint occupation principle and the refusal of Canning to consider any 
concession to the United States in another light, when he forwarded the 
new treaty to Henry Clay on August 10, 1827. Gallatin believed that 
Great Britain was so anxious to prevent a rupture with the United States 
that she was willing to let the territory gradually slip into American 
hands. He also felt that the British only pretended to have vital in­
terests in Oregon because national pride prevented the government from
^^David W. WainhousBs A History of American Foreign Policy 
I776-19IO (New York, 19bl), p7 229.
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relinquishing its claims to the territory. He concluded by predicting
that the country would be settled by Americans and would of necessity
20fhll into American hands. later events were to prove Gallatin correct
in his supposition in regard to Oregon. Canning's policy was designed
to maintain the status quo, and what the United States needed most of
all in Oregpn was time for her settlers to move in and gain a foothold.
The passing years also meant that the fur trade would soon become less
profitable and the British would then have even less reason to fight
for Oregon, "In retrospect* the fight to contain Europe in the Pacific
Northwest was an interim phase of American policy. It was a negative
phase. . . , It kept the Oregon issue and country open until the nation
21was readÿ to follow a more positive course." Such a course the United 
States would not be prepared to follow until the early iB^O's.
In using Canning's foreign policies as a basis for fhture Oregon 
negotiations the British were destined to lose ground* and to continue 
losing ground in Oregon until a more realistic policy of compromise 
might be adopted. Such a realistic Oregon policy was not adopted by 
the British Foreign Office until l8Ll* when Lord Aberdeen became the 
new foreign minister in the Peel government. Under the guidance of Lord 
Aberdeen the Foreign Office took definite steps toward reaching a set­
tlement in the Oregon territory by the adoption of a pacific policy 
designed to promote better Anglo-American relations.
^^eeves* American Diplomacy* p. 2I4I. (American State Papers* 
foreign Relations— Gallatin to Clay* Aug. 10* lE2? T y
^^Merk* Gallatin and the Oregon Problem* p. 23.
cmPTER H  
tCRD ABERDEEN AND THE QREDCN QUESTION
English foreign policy during the period of Lord Melbourne’s 
ministry (l835-l8Ul) was marked by strong feelings of instability and 
distrust. Because Great Britain was in a position where she maintained 
the balance of power in Europe, Melbourne's Foreign Secretary, Viscount 
I^lmerston, could and did practice power diplomacy. Because of this, 
Palmerston, who was known for his lack of tact and diplomacy, succeeded 
not only in causing many foreign nations to doubt the advisability of 
his foreign policy, but raised misgivings in the minds of many English­
men as well. By l81il Britain found herself almost friendless, after 
having alienated most European powers and the United States. Palmerston 
was not completely responsible for the rather sad state of affairs, but 
he did help to contribute to the perplexing situation.
When Melbourne’s government fell, primarily as a result of its 
foreign policy in Europe, Sir Robert Peel was called upon to form a 
government. He did so on September 3, l8Ul„ As his Foreign Minister, 
Peel selected lord Aberdeen, a man who was highly respected in the Con­
servative Party and well qualified to fill the position. The appointment 
of Lord Aberdeen to this important post at a time when Great Britain was 
needful of friends in Europe was a wise move on the part of the new 
Prime Minister. Because both Peel and Aberdeen were strong advocates 
of peace, the government is often referred to as having been a "peace 
government."
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In an attempt to repair some of the damage that had been done as 
far as foreign relations were concerned. Lord Aberdeen took steps to 
regain the friendship and confidence of France and the United States, 
both of whom had in years past allied themselves against Great Britain 
on two occasions. In order to win the friendship of the United States 
and France, Lord Aberdeen was prepared to adopt a pacific policy in 
regard to his relations with both countries. He recognized the fact 
that a possible rupture with the United States would mean that Great 
Britain would not only lose her best customer but might also become in­
volved in a long and bitter war that could not possibly benefit either 
country. To launch this new conciliatory policy Lord Aberdeen sent 
Lord Ashburton (of the House of Baring, which carried on extensive 
banking operations in the United States) to America in the spring of 
l81j,2 to resolve all disputes between the United States and Great Britain. 
The choice of Ashburton was a good one, for he was well known and res­
pected in the United States. The fact that he was married to an American 
helped the cause immensely. Ashburton soon met with Daniel Webster, the 
American Secretary of State, The two men approached their problems in 
a businesslike manner and soon succeeded in establishing a cordial rela­
tionship which made their task much easier.
The main area in dispute between the two countries at the time 
of the appointment concerned the boundary line between Canada and Maine, 
As part of his instructions, however, Ashburton was told that he might 
use Canning's basic policy in regard to any discussion of an Oregon 
boundary. Under no circumstances was he to accept any offer that would 
give the United States land north of the Columbia River. Any American
proposal suggesting a division along the h9^ parallel was to be rejected
PPimmediately.
Even before the Maine boundary question had been settled^ the 
discussions turned to the Oregon boundaryj, but unfortunately nothing 
much came of these discussions, as both Webster and Ashburton felt that 
the discussion of the latter boundary might seriously endanger the more 
important negotiations that were taking place on the northeastern bound­
ary. President Tyler later stated that it was advantageous to waive 
the Oregon discussion as it was not so pressing at that time.^^ It 
would have been desirable to settle the Oregon question in 18^2, but it 
was not imperative to do so. Thus, because neither power desired to 
place the Maine negotiations in jeoparcÿ, both were willing to let the 
matter of Oregon rest until some future date. The Webster-Ashburton 
Treaty was ratified by both countries and promulgated in November, I8I4.2. 
Even thou^ the treaty was intensely attacked in both countries, and 
especially in England by Viscount Palmerston, no one condemned the 
treaty because it did not contain a settlement of the Oregon boundary.
Some critics, however, hinted that they would have been much 
happier if the Oregon boundary had been settled at the same time. One 
such critic was Lord Aberdeen, who, in keeping with his conciliatory 
attitude, soon instructed the British Minister Fox in Washington to ask 
that Edward Everett, the American Minister in London, be authorized to 
negotiate the Oregon boundary. On October 18, 18^2, Aberdeen wrote.
22schafer, The Pacific Northwest, p. 173.
^^Hubert Bancroft, History of the Northwest Coast (San Francisco,
1886), II, 391. (Hereafter cited as Bancroft, Northwest Coast).
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It has appeared to Her Majesty's Government that both parties 
would aot wisely In availing themselves of so ansplclous a 
moment to endeavor to bring to a settlement the only remaining 
snbject of territorial difference. . . .  I speak of the line 
of boundary West of the Rocky Mauntalns, . . . You will pro­
pose to Mr. Webster to move the President to furnish the 
United States Minister at this Court lÆth such Instructions 
as will enable him to enter upon the negotiation of this 
matter with such person as may be appointed by Her Majesty 
for that object^ and you will assure him^ at the same time, 
that we are prepared to proceed to a consideration of it in 
a spiid-t of fairness g and to adjust it on a basis of equitable 
compromise. ^
Though this offer was made in good faith, it soon became apparent that 
President Tyler was more Interested in playing politics than settling 
the disputed boundary. Aberdeen was deeply hurt and annoyed when he 
eventually learned that the President in his annual message on December 
6, l8ii2, had said, . .he would not delay to urge upon Great Britain 
the importance of an early settlement of this long standing contro- 
verqy." Believing that he had not been treated fairly in this ex­
change, Aberdeen betrayed his unhappiness with Tyler in a letter to 
J. ¥. Croker, a Conservative member of Parliament written on February 
22, 1813:
You must know by this time, why I expressed nyself greatly 
dissatisfied with the message of the President, . . , His 
mention of the Oregon question was also most uncandid.
When he talked of pressing us to enter into negotiation, he
had in his pocket a most friendly overture from us which he 
had already answered favourably
This was but one of the many set-backs that Aberdeen faced in trying
Z^George Rives, The United States and Mexico 1821-18L8 (New York, 
1913), II, 13. (Hereafter cne3"aTTEves, U. ^  and"l'e^co).
pt̂̂ Reeves, American Diplomacy, p. 2kho 
^%ives, U. and Mexico, p. 13.
to open negotiations on the Oregon question» He was constantly reas­
sured hy the American ministers that the President and the Congress 
were also anxions to settle the question; but gradually, both Aberdeen 
and Peel began to feel that the United States was not really interested 
in a speecÿ settlement* Mary Americans realized that time was on their 
side, and as each year passed, greater nuWoers of Americans moved into
the Oregon territory. By 18^3 the great mass migrations to Oregon had
begun. This effective occupation gave the United States a much better
claim to the land than it had ever had before.
After waiting for the American government to authorize Edward 
Everett in London to carry on the negotiations, Aberdeen finally decided 
that if something were to be done, it would have to be done in Washing­
ton. Even though Aberdeen would have preferred to negotiate with Everett 
who was very popular and highly respected in Great Britain, he soon began 
to make preparations to reopen the negotiations in America. Aberdeen 
coirectly sensed that the United States had no real desire to authorize 
Everett to negotiate in London, so he decided to send Richard Pakenham 
as a special commissioner to Washington. On October 7, l81t3, Pakenham 
departed from Great Britain for the United States. Almost a month later 
Aberdeen informed Charles Fox that he was being replaced:
It has been thought desirable and indeed necessary, that this 
XOregon Question] should be treated at Washington, and not in 
London, as had formerly been proposed. There is too much reason 
to apprehend that your Relations with the American Government
are not such as to contribute to the prospect of a happy result.
We cannot send another special Mission; and under these circum­
stances, it has been thought expedient for the publick service pv
that your place at Washington should be supplied by Mr, Pakenham.
^"^Wilbur Jones, Lord Aberdeen and the Americas (Athens, Georgia, 
19^8), p. 28, (Aberdeen to Fox, Nov. 2, T8E37. (Hereafter cited as 
Jones, Lord Aberdeen),
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Realizing that Fox was not ■very popular in the United States, the Bri­
tish Foreign Secretary decided to replace him with someone who might 
be better qualified and able to carry on the negotiations in a more 
favorable climate.
Ironicallys on October 8, I8h3g only a short time after Pakenham
left for the United States to open negotiations, Edward Everett finally
received his authorization from President Tyler to commence negotiating
in London. In sending Everett full authority to negotiate, Tÿler "pri-
vately . . . intimated to piis] Minister that the line of the Columbia
could be made acceptable to the Senate, and to public opinion in the
United States, if accompanied by a separate commercial treaty radically
28lowering tariffs on both sides.” In transferring the negotiations to 
the United States, Aberdeen may have missed a good opportunity to reach 
a settlement that would have kept Great Britain on the Columbia River.
But, of course, he had no way of knowing it at that time.
Aberdeen sincerely hoped that Pakenham, upon arriving in the 
United States, would be able to quickly settle the boundary dispute, 
but once again delay followed delay and the new negotiations were post­
poned for several months. Shortly after his arrival in the United States, 
on February 2l|., l8̂ .L, Pakenham informed the American Secretary of State 
Abel Upshur that his government was most anxious to obtain an early set­
tlement of the Oregon dispute. But on the following day Upshur died, 
thus preventing a meeting between the two men. Out of diplomatic cour­
tesy, Pakenham then waited a respectable length of time— in fact, five
^^Saimiel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union (New York 
19^6), p. hS7o (Tyler to Eveirett, Apr. 2V, H.S. ).
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months— before communicating with the new American Secretary of State 
John C. Calhoun in regard to the settlement of the Oregon question.
Calhoun, who was very preoccupied and concerned with the Texas 
annexation question, tended to favor a plan of "wise and masterly inac­
tivity" in regard to Oregon. He believed that time was working in 
favor of American interests in Oregon; therefore, it was not until 
August 23, that the two men met for the first time to discuss a possi- 
ble settlement of the problem. At their first conference Pakenham 
immediately renewed the old British offer of establishing the boundary 
from the Rocky IKountains along the ^9° parallel to the headwaters of 
the Columbia and then along the Columbia River to the Pacific Ocean.
As a slight concession he did offer the United States the use of several 
free ports on Vancouver Island and south of the b9° parallel but he 
insisted upon the Columbia River as the boundary line. After a series 
of five conferences which lasted through September 2L, the two men de­
cided that it would be more profitable to prepare written arguments of 
their claims. As the British had refused to enlarge upon their minor 
concessions and as Calhoun had refused to surrender any American claims 
to the valley of the Columbia, the personal negotiations failed to 
satisfy either negotiator. Even the British offer to refer the ques­
tion to arbitration was flatly rejected by Calhoun.
Even though the British proposals proved unacceptable to the 
United States, Aberdeen was not overly discouraged; he had anticipated 
that the United States would not accept the Columbia River as the 
boundary line and had informed Pakenham of the probable rejection as 
early as March L, iB^b. In the form of additional instructions he 
wrote:
2$
Should Bçr apprehensions be verified, you will endeavor, without 
committing yourself or your government, to draw from the Ameri­
can negotiator a proposal to make the &9th degree of latitude 
the boundary, with the proviso that the ports to the south of 
that parallel to the Columbia inclusive, shall be free ports 
to Great Britain, The navigation of the Columbia should be 
common to both; and care should be taken that the LPth degree 
of latitude, as a boundary, is to extend only to the sea; and 
not to apply to Vancouver’s Island. 9̂
Aberdeen felt that this offer, which incidentally was the first indi­
cation that he was ready to accept the i).9° parallel as the boundary 
line, would be a fair compromise and would have a good chance of being 
accepted in Great Britain and the United States.
By the time that Pakenham had held his first discussions with 
Calhoun he strongly suspected that Edward Everett had convinced the 
American government that Aberdeen would accept the ii9® parallel; there­
fore, Pakenham felt there could be no compromise because, as he put it, 
’The Americans knowing Aberdeen’s pacifism and [being] encouraged to 
bank on it by Everett, believed a policy of delay would be in their
interest, and would eventually bring a complete capitulation by Great
30Britain.” Being convinced that the Americans were playing a waiting 
game, Pakenham did not endeavor to secure this offer from Calhoun; he 
believed if the offer were made and subsequently turned down by the
United States, Great Britain would have lost any possible advantage 
she might previously have had in claiming the lands north of the Colum­
bia River, If Calhoun was aware of the willingness on the part of 
Great Britain to accept the it9° parallel (and in all probability he was
29joseph Schafer, ”The British Attitude Toward the Oregon Ques» 
tion,” The American Historical Review (London, 1911), 171, 296,
30,Jones, Lord Aberdeen, p. 56,
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because of Everett's correspondence), he made no move that might have 
led to a settlement at this particular time. After September 2L, I8UI4, 
little if anything was accomplished as far as the negotiations were 
concerned between Calhoun and Pakenham.
Meanwhile, in Great Britain, Aberdeen who had not previously 
consulted the Cabinet on his proposed L9° parallel concession, wrote 
to Peel on September 2^ and committed himself to this particular policy 
of concession which he planned to follow. In his letter he outlined 
the proposal that he had sent to Pakenham on March ho Peel, who was 
inclined to give Aberdeen a free hand, apparently approved of Aberdeen's 
policy of conciliation, for he made no particular comments or sugges­
tions about it at this time. Almost a month later Aberdeen again wrote 
to Peel and complained that the Oregon territory had no real importance 
but,
. . * the Press of both Countries, and publick clamour, have 
given it a fictitious interest which renders it difficult for 
either Government to act with moderation, or even common sense.
I have no expectation that Mr. Calhoun will agree to any terms 
that we could venture to propose; but this is no reason for 
our not exhausting all the means of settlement in our power.
Aberdeen began to sense the pressure of the newspapers in both countries.
The Oregon question was a ready-made issue for the American election
campaign of l8!tit.
Democratic Party leaders, keeping their ears to the ground, re­
acted to pressure from the northwestern states and the hundreds of 
Oregon pioneers who had moved into the territory since I8LI. The Demo­
cratic nominee, James E. Polk, and his followers were boisterously
31lbid., p. $7.
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claiming all of Oregon up to the iiO® parallel and coining phrases 
like "all of Oregon or none." Such talk and publicity eventually pro­
duced "Oregon fever," a disease that made an American settlement based 
on anything less than the ii9® parallel an impossibility. The election 
of Polk in the fall of 18̂ ^̂  brought the Oregon question to the fore­
front in Anglo-American relations and precipitated an acute crisis 
between the United States and Great Britain which led the two nations 
to adopt a brink-of-war type of diplomacy.
CHAPTER III
BRITISH REACTION TO THE AMERICAN ELECTION OF l8bL
The election of iB^L in the United States proved to he the turn­
ing point in Anglo-American relations in regard to the Oregon question. 
The American people had become Oregon-conscious, many Oregon conventions 
(meetings to promote the re-occupation of Oregon) were held throughout 
the country and the participants loudly proclaimed the right of the 
United States not only to the land north of the parallel but as far 
north as the bO* parallel. The Oregon supporters made it perfectly 
clear that they would consider any cession of lands to Great Britain 
south of the LO' parallel an act of betrayal by their own govern- 
ment. This clamour for "all of Oregon or none" was quickly adopted by 
the democratic Party and incorporated into the party platform.
When the Democrats met at Baltimore to nominate their candidate 
for the presidency on May 27, it soon became apparent that the logical 
contenders for the nomination were too evenly matched and an alternate 
would have to be selected. Much to the surprise of many people, a 
"dark horse" candidate from Tennessee won the nomination over such 
party stalwarts as John Tÿler and Martin VanBuren. James Knox Polk, 
who succeeded in capturing the nomination, was often referred to as 
"Toung Hickory" because of his fondness for .Andrew Jackson. Polk, at 
an early date, had become closely associated with the supporters of the 
Oregon question and he also was known to be a strong supporter of the 
annexation of Texas, Such a background made Polk an ideal candidate
28
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for the Democratic Party,
This era of American history became a period of rapid American
expansion. The Democrats, realizing this, included in their party
platform a plank that caused Great Britain to seriously re-evaluate
her position in Oregon. The fourth plank of the Democratic platform
read as follows:
Resolved, That our title to the whole of the territory of 
Oregon is clear and unquestionable| that no portion of the 
same ought to be ceded to England or any other powerj and 
that the re-occupation of Oregon and the re-annexation of 
Texas at the earliest practicable period are great American 
measures, which this convention recommends to the cordial 
support of the Democracy of the Union.
Little wonder that during the ensuing months of the campaign the Demo­
crats coined phrases like "All of Oregon or none" and I4.O® or fight,"
Such campaigning greatly appealed to the majority of the electorate, 
and of course Pblk was quickly labeled as the man who would see to it 
that all of the democratic promises were faithfully carried out.
The Whigs, on the other hand, had nominated Henry Clay as their 
candidate. It soon became apparent, however, that Clay was straddling 
the fence as far as the Oregon and Texas questions were concerned. His 
failure to take a definite stand on these two issues cost Clay the 
support of the Whig nationalists and the free-soilers in New York state. 
This in turn cost him the election of I8II.
The election of Polk in the fall of I8W: gave the British every 
reason to be apprehensive about their future relations with the United 
States, The election campaign with all of its fancy phrases, threats
3^William Williams, The Shaping of American Diplomacy (Chicago, 
1956), p. 202. (Hereafter cited as Williams, American Diplomacy).
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and premises concerning Oregon had been well publicized in the British
press, and many of the American articles were not greatly appreciated
in England. The British had always felt that the land between the
and 5̂ °̂bO* parallel was unquestionably theirs; the United States had
never seriously questioned the British claims in this area before, just
as Great Britain had never seriously questioned American claims south
of the Columbia. When the Americans began to claim everything as far
north as Alaska, this offended and angered many Englishmen who might
never have given American politics a second thought. What the British
did not understand about the American attitude, however, was the fact
that most Americans considered the dispute over Oregon . . intimately
bound up with those concerning Texas and Mexico, and felt that British
animosity and intrigue against the United States must be countered by
33the use of the same means in each direction." What Americans did not 
comprehend was that the British had no great desire to interfere in the 
affairs of either the United States or Mexico. The British were inter­
ested only In protecting their rights and national honor in Oregon. 
British imperialism had reached a low ebb in the history of the empire; 
experience had shown that the acquisition of new lands proved in most 
cases to be an additional burden on the treasury and not an asset to 
the empire.
The campaign and subsequent election of Polk in 1811 once more 
brought the Oregon question to a position of prominence in Anglo-American 
relations. The campaign helped to make more people of both nations
^^A. W. Whrd, The Cambridge History cf British Foreign Policy 
1783-1919 (Cambridge, 1923), II, 2^57"
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conscious of the dispute; these same people became more convinced that 
their nation’s claims were the only legitimate ones to the territoiy.
The value of the land in question became less importantg  while the 
question of national honor and prestige became an all important consi- 
deration. ifeny Englishmen had only a vague idea of where Oregon was g 
much less a knowledge of its true value; but they could and did under­
stand that the United States was threatening the national prestige and 
honor of their homeland. The president-elect may have been prepared 
to ”look John Bull squarely in the eye," but John Bull was slowly pre­
paring to defend his own viewpoint. This emergent feeling of animosity 
on both sides of the Atlantic made attempts at conciliation very diffi­
cult in the months to follow. Lord Ashburton summed up the situation 
when he wrote John Croker the following letter on November 2^, l8W^:
Our cousin Jonathan is an offensive, arrogant fellow in his manner. %  
nearly all our people he is therefore hated, and a treaty of concilia- 
tion with such a fellow, however considered by prudence or policy to be
* 2  S.
necessary, can in no case be very popular with the multitude." Such 
public feeling as had been built up by the press in both countries and 
to a large extent by American political leaders during the campaign 
made Lord Aberdeen’s task of settling the controversy very difficult.
Conciliation or compromise might very quickly be interpreted as capi­
tulation by the public or by the ever-watchful opposition.
The period of time between the election of Polk in the fall of 
lB14t and his inauguration in March IdkS was marked by a well planned 
wait and see policy in Britain. In early January l8it5, Pakenham informed
3k•Rives, U^ So and Mexico, p. l6<
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Calhoun that he had not received any new instructions from his govern­
ment in regard to their last discussion. The British government merely 
bided its time and waited to see what Polk's new administration would 
do. Thqy hoped that Polk^ having won the election^ would now adopt a 
more conciliatory policy.
In late January^ Pakenham once more suggested that the question 
be referred to arbitration, but this offer was flatly rejected by Cal­
houn on January 21, 18^5, as he did not want to commit the new govern­
ment to a policy that the new administration might not wish to follow 
when in office after March L.
After Calhoun's rejection of the British offer of arbitration as 
a means of solving the problem. Prime Minister Peel appeared to be quite 
disturbed, for on February 23, he wrote a long letter to Aberdeen in 
which he strongly emphasized the importance of an amicable settlement 
of the Oregon question. The bitter debates in the Congress, he felt, 
were going to make conciliation very difficult, if not impossible. Peel 
also wanted to ascertain if Great Britain was actually in a superior 
position in Oregon. He then suggested that Britain should send a frig­
ate secretly to the mouth of the Columbia along with a small artillery 
force to bolster the strength of their forces there. Aberdeen put 
Peel off by finally convincing him that any preparations for war, such 
as sending additional British forces to Oregon, would only contribute 
to war lysteria and might even precipitate a war. Peel accepted this 
argument for the time being. % e n  challenged in the House of Commons 
on March 3, by the Radical Roebuck, who demanded to see the papers
^^Jones, Lord Aberdeen, p. 57. (Peel to Aberdeen, Feb. 23, 18^5).
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relating to the Oregon negotiations^, Peel pat him off hy indicating 
that the government wag aware of the importance of the question.
Upon President Polk's inauguration (March hs> l8b2), the British 
government learned that the new president evidently planned to carry 
out his campaign promises in regard to Oregon. In his inaugural address, 
after first speaking of Texasg  President Polk turned to the Oregon ques­
tions
Nor will it become in a less degree sy duty to assert and main­
tain hy all constitutional means the right of the United States
to that portion of our territory which lies beyond the Rocky 
Mountains. Our title to the country of Oregon is "clear and 
unquestionable^" and alrea^ are our people preparing to per­
fect that title by occupying it with their wives and children 
. . . To us belongs the duty of protecting them adequately 
wherever they m ^  be upon our soil. . . .3°
Even though President Polk had carefully omitted the word "whole" in 
front of Oregon* the tone of his message produced an angry and uniform 
reaction in Great Britain. The British newspapers all carried Polk's 
address, along with their own editorial comments about the new presi­
dent's lack of manners and diplomatic tact. While Polk was generally 
derided in the papers for his attitude and comments, only one paper 
went so far as to suggest war with the United States. The London 
Colonial Magazine stated:
A war with America cannot but be productive of good. Never 
before were the states of the union In a worse condition for
carrying on a war; never . . .  was England better fitted. .
. . To appease the United States would be merely to pave the 
way for fresh Ingglts from a country on which little reliance 
is to be placed.
36siair and Elves, eds.,The Congressional Globe (Washington, 
181̂5), 117, WO. —   —
Oscar Mnther, The Great Northwest (New York, 19L8), p. lit?.
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While such a radical step as war with the United States did not reflect 
the thinking of the majority of the populace^ the article certainly 
must have caused many Englishmen to seriously consider the possiblli- 
ties of such a war. The very tone of the article seems to suggest that 
this might be the ideal time to teach those wayward Americans a lesson 
that was long overdue.
Parliament reacted in a like manner. A series of rather heated 
debates took place in early April (these debates will be discussed in 
their entirety in Chapter 17). Members of the Parliament deeply re- 
sented the implications of the address, especially the Whig opposition 
under the leadership of Lord John Russell. Lord Aberdeen, in his defense 
of the British interests in Oregon, tried to pass the matter off lightly 
by sayings
I wish to observe that this speech is not an address made to 
the Congress— it is a speech made to the public, the Congress 
hot being sitting. Undoubtedly, no speech of such a nature 
could be made by the President of the United States without 
drawing towards it the most serious attention. Nevertheless 
it does not possess the Importance of an official message, 
forming a part of legislative proceedings.3°
Even though :Lord Aberdeen would have preferred to treat the matter as 
though it had no real significance, he was not allowed to do so as the 
Parliament, including the opposition, officially went on record as 
declaring that England also had rights in Oregon and would be prepared 
to uphold those rights. That the situation was grave, there can be 
little doubt; party politics were forgotten for the moment as all fac­
tions joined together to present a united front to the United States.
3&Eugene McCormack, James K. Polk A Political Biography (Berke­
ley, 1922), p. S63. (Hereafter cited as McCormack, James K. Polk).
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Significantly^ Lord Aberdeen felt the inaugural important enough to 
warrant the following assurance to the Queen on March 27t "The lang­
uage of the new President is menacing, but he will have been made fully
aware of the determination of Tour Majesty's Government to uphold at
39all hazards the rights and honour of this country." The general con­
sensus seemed to be that President Polk could bluster and talk if he 
felt such bombast was necessary, but if he actually tried to do what 
he talked of doing he would have to answer to John Bull.
In view of President Polk's attitude in regard to the Oregon 
dispute Lord Aberdeen decided that it would be more advisable for Great 
Britain not to make any new proposals until after the new administration 
had had an opportunity to present an offer of its own. He advised 
Pakenham in mid-April that in the event the United States should pro­
pose a settlement based on the k9^ parallel it was doubtful that Great 
Britain would be able to accept such a proposal. This new policy on 
the part of Aberdeen reflects a marked change in the British attitude, 
for only thirteen months before he had informed Pakenham that such a 
proposal might very well be approved.
The impasse in the negotiations was broken on July 12, l8L5, 
when President Polk, feeling that he was committed by the acts of his 
predecessors, authorized the new Secretary of State James Buchanan to 
propose once again the ii.9° parallel as a compromise boundary. In a 
note to Pakenham on July 12, Buchanan reviewed the American claims to
39Hunter Miller, Treaties and Other International Acts of the 
United States of America ( Washington, 1%7)« V. 29. CQooted from ike 
Sdrrespondence of üeôrge, Earl of Aberdeen, 18&5, p. 102). (Hereafter 
cited as Miller, Treaties).
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Oregon and concluded by offering the #9 parallel®
Minister Pakenham, acting only upon his own initiative, then 
proceeded to make one of the biggest miscalculations of his political 
career when, in his reply to Secretary Buchanan's note, he rejected the 
American offer without even referring it to Whitehall® On July 29, 
Secretary Buchanan received from Pakenham a well written argument In 
which Pakenham controverted all of Buchanan's previous arguments. This 
argumentative masterpiece created a great diplomatic blunder on the part 
of the British government® In closing his message, Pakenham expressed 
the hope "that the American plenipotentiary will be prepared to offer 
some further proposal for the settlement of the Oregon question more 
consistent with fairness and equity, and with reasonable expectations 
of the British Government. The only defense that might be offered 
for Pbkenham's abrupt refusal of the new American offer Is that Pakenham 
had been Informed of the reaction In Great Britain to the President's 
Inaugural and he also knew that Britain had three times previously re­
jected the same American proposal. There Is little reason to doubt that 
the British Minister had taken a great deal upon himself In not forward- 
ing the proposal to the British government for Its consideration.
Pakenham's rejection of the American proposal produced a counter- 
reaction on August 30, l8ij.5j when Buchanan delivered a note to Pakenham 
stating that the American offer was to be considered officially withdrawn,
Wsdgar L. Erickson, ed«, British Sessional Papers House of 
Commons (lew York, 1961), III, 10Ù-Ï99®
^^Samuel Flagg Bemis, The American Secretaries of State and Their 
Diplomacy (New York, 1928), (HereZPter cited as 5emis,“̂ .
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President Polk, ;dio had become very angry when he learned of Pakenham's 
rejection of the American proposal, had personally supervised Buchanan's 
message withdrawing the American offer. In this message it was also 
intimated that the United States would once again assert its full rights 
in the Oregon territory. Polk also refused to make any new proposals 
for future negotiations; in other words, any fhture negotiations would 
originate with Great Britain or they simply would not be forthcoming.
For his part Pakenham did not seem to be disturbed by this turn of 
events, he felt that the Americans had no real interest in securing a 
fair and equitable compromise in Oregon, and that they were content 
simply to try to force Britain into making humiliating concessions.
By late l8b3\ the Oregon negotiations had reached another impasse^ 
President Polk was adamant in refusing to make any new proposals; as far 
as he was concerned any future moves would have to be made by Great 
Britain. In Great Britain, Aberdeen was trying his best to undo the 
damage that had been done when Pakenham rejected the American proposal. 
In an interview with the new American Minister, Louis McLane, Aberdeen 
condemned Pakenham's actions. A tragic mistake had been made, he be­
lieved, but he was not sure how the damage could be repaired. Even 
Prime Minister Peel felt that England had lost any advantage she mi^t 
have had because Pakenham's rejection was "needlessly harsh and peremp­
tory, and jTheJ predicted the United States would not relinquish the 
diplomatic advantage she had gained, but he opposed any further conces­
sion as a means of setting things right.
bZjones, Lord Aberdeen, p. 6l. (Quoted from the Aberdeen Papers^ 
Peel to Aberdeen, Oct. È,
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The one pereon who was largely responsible for the breakdown of 
negotiations, Richard Pakenham, new fonnd himself in a serious dUemma.
He was not only in trouble with the American government, but with his 
own government as well. Instead of being congratulated for his negotia­
tions, he was being condemned for them, Pakenham decided that the wise 
thing to do would be to rectify the situation if it were still possible, 
so on October 23, he visited Buchanan in his office. Several conferences 
followed during the next two days in which Pakenham expressed regret that 
the American offer had been withdrawn. He intimated that his government 
would be very glad to hear from the United States on the subject. He 
denied that he had rejected the former American proposal by saying,
"What I said was that I did not feel at liberty to accept it,"^3 Secre­
tary Buchanan felt that the negotiations should be reopened in view of 
his infonnal talks with Pakenham, but President Polk refused, for he was 
not willing to accept anything in the line of conciliation, whether it 
be an apology or a new British proposal, unless it were made officially 
by the British government.
This stalenKite in negotiations continued on through the months of 
October and November with no apparent change in sight. On Decenber 2, 
l8b5^ President Polk added to the tensions when he presented his first 
annual message to the 29th Congress, In reference to the Oregon dispute, 
Polk reviewed the three previous attempts of the United States to settle 
the dispute under Monroe and Adams, and then informed the Congress of 
his own proposal which had been so rudely rejected by Pakenham, He ex­
plained how he had withdrawn the American offer and had reasserted the
hJReeves, American Diplomacy, p, 2^7,
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American right to the entire territory because the British rejection 
freed him of the obligation to follow the compromise policies of his 
predecessors. The President recommended to Congress two courses of 
action: first, notice should be given to terminate the joint-occupancy 
made in l827g and secondly, the Congress should determine what legisla­
tion could be adopted without violating this convention. He also sug­
gested that the protection of American laws and jurrisdiction immediately 
be extended over American citizens in Oregon. In closing his speech, 
the President said, if the Congress should give notice to terminate 
joint-occupation, then the United States would have reached a point when 
its national rights in Oregon would either have to be abandoned or firmly 
maintained, and such rights could not be abandoned without a sacrifice 
of both national honor and interest.
The last part of the President's speech proved to be particularly 
offensive to the British, who also had national rights and honor to 
maintain in Oregon. Once again the British public and Her Majesty's 
government became aroused over the Oregon question. The London Times, 
in an editorial on January 3, 181:6, favored a very moderate approach to 
the problem when they suggested that the British government "should 
renew the offers sanctioned by the American President on the basis of 
the LPth parallel." The Times cont.inued by saying that "President Polk's 
message implied the terms of war, or conclusive negotiation. War was 
too monstrous to be thought of, except after every effoi-t at a compro- 
mise had been exhausted.
^McCormack, James K. Polk, p. 579.
Ii5James Schouler, History of the United States of America, Under 
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On two separate occasions between the date of the President's 
inaugural address and Januaiy l8, 181̂ .6, Pakenham again requested that 
the United States accept arbitration as the solution to the problem.
Both times Buchanan informed Pakenham that the United States would not 
submit any question to arbitration that involved their territorial rights. 
The only concession that President Polk appeared willing to make was that 
he would submit any reasonable British proposals to the Senate for its 
previous advise if he believed the proposal had some merit. This in 
itself was Polk's loophole to make it possible for the negotiations to 
continue. Polk personally would accept nothing less than the 1̂:° 1;0' 
parallel as the basis for any settlement. However, in offering to refer 
any reasonable British proposal to the Senate for its advise he was 
leaving the door open for the British to propose the parallel. If 
this proposal met with the approval of the Senate, that body could then 
recommend to the President that he accept the proposal; he would then 
be relieved of the responsibility of having been the one who wanted to 
accept the offer. Although Polk's diary indicates that he did not rel­
ish the thought of a war with Great Britain, there is no evidence to 
indicate that he feared such a war if it should come as a result of the 
Oregon dispute.
% t h  the opening of the new year, lord Aberdeen found himself in 
a predicament as far as Oregon was concerned. The British government, 
having lost the initiative in Oregon, was now on the defensive because 
of Pakenham's blunder. In order to understand the actions of Lord 
Aberdeen and the British government in carrying the Oregon negotiations 
on through to a successful conclusion one finds it necessary to become
ai
familiar vlth the activities of the Opposition party and the instability 
of the Peel government in 18^5 and 18^6. At times outside pressures 
caused Lord Aberdeen to operate under unusual conditions where he could 
not always do things as he might have preferred. Oregon was such a
case.
CHAPrm 17
THE CREQŒ QUESTION AND THE OPPOSITION— l8ii5
It is the purpose of this chapter to demonstrate the precarious 
position of the Peel government in I8LS, and to show how the govern­
ment's policies in regard to Oregon were largely dictated by unfavorable 
conditions at home. After taking office in 18^1, Sir Robert Peel was 
able to alleviate some of the immediate pressures upon his ministry, but 
he was unable to protect Lord Aberdeen from the attacks of the opposi­
tion parties in regard to the Oregon controversy. E^en though the Ore­
gon question was greatly overshadowed by domestic issues in England, it 
proved to be a lever through which the opposition could bring pressure 
to bear on the government. The result was that Lord Aberdeen was forced 
to evaluate carefully any policies he might wish to implement in regard 
to the Oregon controversy; not on the basis of whether such policies 
would be of benefit to England, but on the basis of lAiether such poli­
cies, if adopted, would place the alreac^ shaky Peel government in a 
position where it could be attacked by the opposition for having con­
ceded too much to the United States. Criticism from the opposition 
parties forced Lord Aberdeen to conduct the Oregon negotiations in 
secret; be consistently refused to reveal any information in regard to 
the state of the negotiations to anyone except Prime Minister Peel.
Two separate and distinct factions were anxious to bring about 
the fall of Peel's Ministry. The Whigs, who had been out of office 
since l81il, were anxious to return to power under the leadership of Lord
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John Russell. The second faction was the Toung England" group who be­
lieved that Peel had turned against his party and betrayed the landed 
gentry who had elected him to office. One of the key personalities In 
this latter group was Benjamin Disraeli, a man of great oratorical abil­
ity who at one time had been a strong supporter of Peel. But by l8Wt, 
Disraeli had left the ranks of the party and was doing his best to cause 
the fall of Her Majesty's government. These two factions, the Whigs and 
Disraeli's group, posed as the watch dogs of British honor and national 
Interests. When the Peel government made a major mistake or a capitula­
tion, these two groups attacked with a vengeance. Ironically, the Whigs, 
under Dord John Russell, supported the Peel government during Its last 
slK months In office; without this support Peel could not have succeeded 
In repealing the Corn Daws. Vigorous attacks were made on the govern­
ment by the Whigs, however, because of Aberdeen's conciliatory policy In 
regard to Oregon. Although he did play an Important part In the defeat 
of the government In I81t6, there Is no ascertainable evidence to Indi­
cate that Disraeli played a major role as far as the Oregon question 
was concerned.
Most members of the opposition groups in 18^2 felt that Dord 
Aberdeen's Oregon policy was weak and spineless, that he had a tendency 
to concede too much In his dealings with the Americans. The view of 
one American historian was that, "Under any circumstances to concede to 
the United States what previous British governments had declined to 
yield for over a quarter of a century was a grave political risk; to 
concede It after the menace of the Polk Inaugural was to expose the 
government to the charge of having abandoned national pride and honor.
This political fear was the chief barrier in 18^^=181^6 to an Oregon 
p e a c e . Présidait Pblk in his inaugural speech had quickly changed 
the Oregon question from a dispute between two nations over an undefined 
land area to a dispute that involved the question of national prestige 
and honor. This made later negotiations much more complex and difficult 
than they had been prior to March of
One of the severest critics of Aberdeen's foreign policies was 
Viscount Palmerston, a Whig, who had previously been Melbourne's foreign 
minister. In l8L2, for example, Palmerston had viciously attacked the 
Webster-Ashburton Treaty, contending that the treaty represented a capi­
tulation of the worst kind, even though the treaty had been well received 
by the majority of the Parliament. The following year, in March, he 
again attacked the government's Oregon policy in the House of Commons:
If the Senate had passed a bill, for immediately taking forcible 
possession of the whole territory of Oregon; and if the senator 
who brought up the bill had expressed his conviction that the 
American claim would immediately be acquiesced in by Great Bri­
tain, if it was only urged, in what he pleased to call a proper 
manner, it is impossible, I conceive, that this bill should pass 
the other branches of the legislature; but if it were to pass, 
and to be acted upon, it would be a declaration of war.*?
Actually, the bill in question. Senator Lewis Linn's bill, had passed
the Senate by a slim margin on February 6, but it later failed to pass
in the House of Representatives and automatically died in committee when
the House adjourned at the end of the year. Prime Minister Peel refused
to discuss such hypothetical causes of war with Palmerston as he had the
^^Frederick Merk, "British Government Propaganda and the Oregon 
Treaty, " The American Historical Review, XL (193S)» 1:0. (Hereafter
cited as Merk, "British PropagandPHT^
hrlBancroft, Northwest Coast, p. 39b°
assurance of the American government that they wished the controversy to 
be settled in a peaceful mannero Nevertheless^ frequent attacks by Pal- 
merston succeeded In causing the Peel government to fear that any con- 
cessions t h ^  might make would be branded as capitulation» Many of the 
Miigs suspected that Palmerston's attacks on the government were made 
for partisan reasons; some believed that Palmerston was not only deter­
mined to belittle the Foreign Office, but also anxious to replace Lord 
John Russell as the Opposition leader» "Palmerston's determination to 
find fault with everything that is done In the Foreign Office, and the 
Indiscriminate abuse which he heaps upon eveiy part of our foreign pol­
icy," wrote Charles Grevllle, a privy council clerk, "deprives his 
opinion of the weight which it would be entitled to if he was only 
tolerably liq^artlal."^^ While there Is sufficient evidence to Indicate 
that the Conservatives did not take Palmerston's attacks too seriously, 
there Is also a good deal of evidence to Indicate that the felt they 
had to be extremely careful not to do anything that would give Palmerston 
an advantage that he might successfully use against the Conservative 
Party. TXirlng this period both Aberdeen and Peel continued their paci­
fic policies, even though the American election campaign of I8LL and 
the Opposition attacks made such a program exceedingly difficult » The 
government realized that the "recurring distress and agitation among 
the working classes gave abundant warning » » » that so grave an econo- 
mic disturbance as would be Involved In a war with the United States
Frederick Mérk, "British Party Politics and the Oregon Treaty," 
The American Historical Review, XXVII (1932) 66» (Hereafter cited as 
Merk, "British Politics").
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]iQwas not to be risked so long as any way of escape were open." The 
British people who were faced with serious economic problems of high 
prices and low wages were not likely to appreciate any additional tax 
burdens imposed upon them by the government to support an unnecessary 
war.
While Polk was industriously campaigning on the platform^ "all 
of Oregon or none" in the fall of l8W^, Aberdeen was firmly committing 
himself to a compromise along the parallel. As early as March of 
the same year he had advised Pakenham that Britain might possibly 
accept the parallel. In September, he attempted to convince Peel 
that such a compromise would be fair to both countriesg
The American claim extends to the ^Lth degree of latitude, 
he wrote to Peel on September 25, and I think considering the 
negotiations which have already- taken place, that t h ^  will 
not be brought to concede to us more than to the L9th. This 
line If carried through to the ocean, and applied to Vancouver 
Island, would exclude us from the entrance of Puget's Sound, 
and all harbors within It, which are the really valuable part 
of the territory.
I believe that If the line of the b9th degree were extended 
only +0 the waters edge, and should leave us In possession of 
all Vancouver's Island, with the northern side of the entrance 
to Puget's Sound; and If all the harbors within the Sound, and 
to the Columbia, Inclusive, were made free to both countries; 
and fbrther, if the river Columbia from the point at which It 
became navigable to Its mouth, were also made free to both, this 
would be In reality a most advantageous settlement.
It Is apparent from the tone of this letter that Aberdeen had definitely
committed himself to "the 14.9° parallel with a few modifications.
But why, contemporaries wondered. If Aberdeen was rea^y to accept
^^Henry Commanger, "England and the Oregon Treaty--l8L6," The 
Oregon Historical Quarterly, XXVIII (1927), 31.
^%obert G„ Clark, "Aberdeen and Peel on Oregon==l8bL," The 
Oregon Historical Quarterly, XXXIV (1933), 237. (Hereafter citê3”as 
Clark, "Aberdeen and Peel",
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the li9° parallel as the final boundarj settlement even before Polk had 
been elected president, was the question prolonged until June of 18^6. 
Part of the answer to this question may be found in Peel’s reply to 
Aberdeen’s letter of the 2$th:
I incline to arbitration rather than any important concession 
beyond former proposais; if I recollect right there are on record 
in the F[oreig4 0 [ffice] very strong opinions, but with reference 
to consideration of policy and justice, as to the impropriety of 
carrying concession beyond certain defined limits.
I would not be afraid of a good deal of preliminary bluster 
on the part of the Americans. The best answer to it would be to 
direct the Collingwood to make a friendly visit when she has 
leisure, to the mouth of the Columbia.^
Peel emphasized three main points in his letter: first, he preferred
that the problem be settled by means of arbitration (Aberdeen later made
such an offer to the United States on two occasions at the beginning of
the new year with no success)| second, he warned against any concession
that might exceed any previous British offers as this might give the
Opposition party the opportunity it wanted to charge the government with
capitulation; and third, he suggested that a show of military strength
would be most appropriate. Aberdeen was able to convince the Prime
Minister that a show of naval strength in Oregon would only contribute
to the already mounting tensions between the two countries.
On the day before President-elect Polk made his inaugural address
— which as noted above shook the British from their complacency— )&.
Roebuck of the Opposition inquired in the House of Commons:
...Whether the right hon. Gentleman [Peel} had any objection 
on the part of Her Majesty’s Government, to lay the negotia­
tions, as far as it has proceeded, before the House.
The reason he asked, Roebuck continued, was because the
^Ibid., p. 236.
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world already knew . . . that a Bill had already passed the
House of Representatives, with regard to . . . making Oregon 
what was called a territory. . . . This country Britain was 
not accustomed to bluster, but it must be apparent to all 
that this was a proceeding not to be submitted to quietly.
The law for taking possession of the Territory had cer- 
tainly passed one branch of legislature; and if we took no 
steps to counteract what had been done, our national rights 
might be infringed; and the rights of Individuals invaded.
This country ought to have declared that the United States 
had no pretext for going westward of the Rooky Mountains.52
Roebuck concluded by asking if the Ministers were going to leave the 
P&rliament completely in the dark on such an important natter. The 
Prime Minister answered in a manner that became typical of both himself 
and his Foreign Minister in later months, when they were asked to fur­
nish the Parliament with information on the Oregon negotiations. Peel, 
who pointed out that the negotiations were being carried on with the 
executive branch of the United States government and not with the Legis- 
lature, preferred not to lay any correspondence before the Parliament 
as it might injure negotiations. The Prime Minister agreed with Mrv 
Roebuck that "nothing could be more unseemly than to bluster, but while 
he refrained from any expressions of the kind it was not to be supposed 
that the British Government was not duly sensible of the importance of 
the question." No further discussion took place at this time; the 
majority of the members of Parliament preferred to learn the content of 
the President's inaugural address before pushing the question further.
Parliament did not wait long to find out what Polk pronounced in 
his inaugural, for by early April the British papers carried the text 
of the President's address. Not since l8l2 had relations between Great
^^Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (London, I8it5), LXXVIII, 235. 
S^Ibid, p. 237.
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Britain and the United States become so strained. Indignation and 
anger were prevalent among the British people. Newspapers carried 
articles similar to the one that appeared in the London Timess "In 
spite of his [President Polk^ marauders and what he terms his Consti­
tutional rights, the territory of Oregon will never be wrested from 
the British Crown to which it belongs, but by war."^^ Polk, without 
even trying, had succeeded in uniting the British people in opposition 
to any concessions in Oregon; thus he inadvertently made Aberdeen's 
task much more difficult.
On April L, 18^2, the Whig Opposition,in what apparently was a 
pre-planned attack on the government, introduced more inquiries about 
the state of the Oregon negotiations. Because of the seriousness of 
the debates, the question was handled in a very responsible manner by 
both paities. Even though the discussions produced what appeared out­
wardly to be a strong united front on the part of the entire Parliament, 
it is possible to detect the warning tone of the Vhigs during the course 
of the debates. Lord John Russell, who introduced the question in the 
House of Commons, claimed that he did not wish to embarrass the govern­
ment but that the tone of Polk's inaugural address made it necessary 
for him to speak. He briefly reviewed the early claims of both coun­
tries to the territory and then continued:
I am sure they will feel it impossible to allow the present 
undefined and unsettled state of relations between the two 
countries to continue, without incurring great danger that 
the people of the United States, acting upon the suggestion
of the President may endeavor to disturb British subjects in
^^Bemis, Am. Secretaries of State, 7, 2^7,
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rights which they hold by virtue of Treaties, and may produce 
a state of things dangerous to the peace of the two countries.
Russell, disclaiming any pretension to advise the government on what it
should do, felt that Her Majesty's Government should not
. . . make any proposal which shall be less than the proposal 
made by Ifr. Canning, with any regard for our own interests, or 
our own honor.
In conclusion. Lord Russell then discussed the supposed value of the
territory in question and argued that even though the area might be as
worthless as many claimed. Great Britain could not yield to the bluster
of the United States. Once again the ghost of Canning's Oregon policy
had returned to hamstring Aberdeen's pacific policy.
The Arlme Minister rose and answered Russell's q;uestions by once
again evading the real issue. Peel admitted Russell's right to inquire
into the state of the negotiations, but refused to present any pertin-
ent information that the Commons would like to hear.
%hile negotiations are pending. Peel said, through the means 
of persons regularly constituted with a distinct authority for
that purpose, unless there be plain reasons for the exercise 
of their right, it is politic to abstain from the exercise of 
free discussion in popular assemblies upon topics of this 
description. It is so eaqy to excite public feeling in such 
assemblies, that, unless there be grave cogent arguments for 
the contrary course, it is better to leave such matters to 
the discretion of those who are entrusted with the care of 
the honour and interests of the country.
Peel promised that if the negotiations should fail he would then lay
the Oregon correspondence before the House. The Prime Minister closed
by spring that he hoped the members of Parliament would leave the matter 
in the hands of the government.
^^Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (London, I8it5), LXXIX, 178-79. 
S^ibid., p. 193.
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VlBcount Palmerston was the only other member of the House to 
speak. His speech* though including an offer of support to the govern­
ment on the qnestion of British rights in Oregon, contained a clear 
warning to the Conservative government. Before discussing the Oregon 
situation, Palmerston took the occasion to defend his attacks upon the 
government three years before, e.g., after the Ashburton Treaty had 
been concluded:
I trust that on every occasion when it has been ny duty to 
state my opinions to the House, I have always abstained as 
much as circumstances would permit from any personal attack 
upon any individual, but if individuals choose to accept 
great and important functions, they must expect that their 
public conduct and their public acts will be liable to such 
observations as any one may think it is his duty to make.
And I only say, when observations are made by persons who, 
in By opinion have in the discharge of great important public 
trusts, from whatever motive it may have arisen— whether it 
be from natural incapacity, or from opinions— speculative 
opinions— inconsistent with the duties thgy have to perform, 
whenever such persons sacrifice the honour or the interest of 
this country, it will be a matter of entire indifference to 
me in what manner such individuals m ^  speak of any strictures 
I feel it my duty to make upon them.^
Palmerston, while agreeing with the government in part, indicated that
he would not hesitate to attack anyone that he felt was not performing
his task properly. In fact, he deemed it his duty to eocpose such a
person, or persons.
In the House of lords, where lord Clarendon introduced the ques­
tion, discussion followed a pattern veiy similar to that in the Commons. 
He expressed the hope that Her Majesty’s Ministers would not hesitate 
to adopt apy course that might be necessary to protect the national 
honor and interests in Great Britain;
57lbid., pp. 199-201.
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It is hardly possible to believe that aqy negotiations iipon 
this subject are pending, or they have ever been commenced or 
even proposed, if we are to draw from the President’s Speech 
the inference which it must naturally suggest| for not only 
does he not make the slightest allusion to them, but he for­
mally announces that the right of the Americans to the Oregon 
Territory is clear and unquestionable: and It Is consequently 
difficult to understand upon what ground he could justify to 
the citizens of the United States the right of their Govern­
ment to negotiate at all upon a matter not doubtful; . . . in 
short, the whole question Is treated by the President as one 
completely settled— as if all negotiations were concluded, or 
none had ever been contemplated^ . . .2°
Clarendon seriously doubted that any negotiations could have been tak­
ing place if one were to judge the situation on the basis of Polk’s 
Inaugural* Concerned lest the government might surrender all British 
rights In Oregon to the United States, he then asked that the govern­
ment furnish the House with copies of the negotiations and what had 
transpired in the past.
Lord Aberdeen's reply was very similar to that made by the Prime 
Mnister in the House of Commons. That Aberdeen and Peel had antlcl- 
pated that the question would be raised by the Opposition and had pre­
viously agreed on the substance of their answers seems certain. The 
Foreign Minister did take this opportunity, however, to Issue a warning 
to both the United States and the Opposition. He answered lord Claren­
don's question by saying that the time might come when It would be 
necessary to present the Lords with all the materials that pertained 
to the negotiations, however, he felt that such action would be impoli­
tic and completely unsuitable at the present time as it might tend to 
Injure the state of the negotiations. He contended that British rights 
in Oregon were the same as they had always been and that Polk's Inaugural
28lbld., pp. 115-117.
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address did not change them. The Foreign Minister then reiterated his 
own desire to seek a warning to both the United States and the Opposi­
tions
Lords, I consider war to be the greatest folly, if not the 
greatest crime, of which a country could be guilty, if lightly 
entered into, . . .  It is the duty and I am sure it is the 
inclination of Her Majesty's Government to preserve peace; at 
the same time there are limits which must not be passed, and 
I say that, without attaching too much weight to questions of 
national honour— for I think, fortunately for this country, 
that we need not be very sensitive in these matters— it is not 
for us, God knows to "seek the bubble reputation at the cannon’s 
mouth," . . . .  But our honour is a substantial property that 
we can certainly never neglect and we may owe it to ourselves 
and to posterity to adopt a course contrary to all our desires, 
to all our inclinations.
%  Lords, from what I have said, your Lordships will per­
ceive an earnest of the spirit of peace which shall pervade 
this matter, if I continue to conduct the negotiation; . . .
Should it be otherwise, I can only may that we possess rights 
which, in our opinion, are clear and unquestionable; and by 
the blessings of God, and ygar support, those rights we are 
fully prepared to maintain.
Even though Aberdeen refused to lay before the Lords any correspondence
relating to Oregon, he had taken the opportunity to make it clear that
he would not lightly begin war over a question of national honor, yet,
he would fight if it became necessary. The Government’s refusal to
bring the papers relating to Oregon before the Parliament ended the
discussion of the subject in that boĉ y for almost a year.
However, the Oregon question was not forgotten. The Foreign 
Office continued its attempts to reach a settlement with the United 
States, but with little success. As the time approached for President 
Polk to make his first annual address. Lord Aberdeen evidenced his ap­
prehension in a letter to the Prime Minister on November 23, I8it5.
^̂ Ibid., pp. 123-12%.
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Aberdeen referred to several newspapers which had published extracts 
from an American paper predicting that Pblk would ask for an end to the 
joint occupation of Oregon. He commented that If this is really "the 
case and the paragraph In question gives us an accurate notion of the 
Ih'esident’s message, we must prepare for serious consequences."^^ Some 
of the obvious doubt and concern of the Foreign Minister was allayed 
through correspondence with Edward Everett and his frequent discussions 
with the American Minister Louis McLane; the latter led him to believe 
that Polk would make a strong declaration in his annual message, but 
that it would not endanger the possibility of a peaceful settlement of 
the question. Evidence of such reassurances are found in a letter from 
Peel to Aberdeen In early Decenfcers "If Mr. Everett assures you that 
the Miig Phrty in the United States would agree to arbitration on the 
Oregon Question, I think considering the opinions expressed by Mr. Cal- 
houn, even Polk dare not resort to extreme measures.
Encouraged by the reassurance of the two Americans, Lord Aberdeen
wrote Richard Pakenham on December 3, a very optimistic letter In which
he summarized his views of the Oregon situation.
Notwithstanding the unpromising appearance of the present state 
of the negotiations, I feel satisfied that we are now nearer a 
settlement than ever. If we press arbitration, they must either 
accept it, or give us facilities for reopening the direct nego­
tiations. If they do neither, they will be so manifestly in the 
wrong, that I greatly doubt their receiving the necessary support, 
even from the hostile portion of the American Publlck. I expect 
a strong declaration from the President In his annual message 
and even a recommendation to terminate the Treaty. I shall not 
at all regret this; for as the crisis becomes more imminent, the 
chances of settlement improve.
^Jones, Lord Aberdeen, p. 77. ^^Ibld., p. 78.
^^Ibld., p. 78. Quoted from the Aberdeen Papers— b3123, Dec. 3, 18^^.
Aberdeen anticipated that the Americans would now be forced to take
proper steps to solve the problem in a fair and peaceful manner or to
accept the responsibility for the failure of the negotiations in the
eyes of the world. Unfortunately the members of the Cabinet did not
possess Aberdeen's optimism. Sir Robert Peelg after reading the text
of Polk's message, declared, "We shall not reciprocate blustering with
Polk, but shall quietly make an increase in the Naval, Military and
Ordnance Estimât es. At the same time, however, the London Times
came out strongly in favor of compromise; as the Times was considered
to be the official mouthpiece for the government, it may be assumed
that Peel was in actuality reciprocating bluster with Polk. In an
attempt to restrain his colleagues and keep them from acting rashly.
Lord Aberdeen wrote the following to Peel on December 2$:
I am glad he has brought matters to an issue, and whether the 
Senate adopt his recommendation or not, I cannot doubt that 
we shall see a reasonable settlement. I have never been 
afraid of the Oregon question; and feel confident that in 
the course of the year we shall see it finally settled, 
either by arbitration, or by direct negotiation.^^
At this stags of the negotiations, when it appeared as though a new 
crisis was emerging between the two nations, Aberdeen seemed to be in 
complete control of the situation. He not only refused to let the 
situation become ciucial in the Parliament, but he also initiated a 
program in the press to educate the British public to accept a compro­
mise boundary line. At such a time when Lord Aberdeen seemed so con­
fident that the Oregon question would be peacefully settled near
^^Philip So Klein, President James Buchanan (University Park,
1962), p. 181.
61iJones, Lord Aberdeen, p. 78,
catastrophe struck the Peel goTernment because of Internal problems, 
relating to the high protective tariffs on c o m  and the deplorable 
economic conditions In the country.
By late fall of l8!ĵ , the Peel government began to show signs of 
collapsing. Besides having serious International problems to contend 
with, the Prime Minister now found himself forced to adopt a free trade 
program Inimical to the landed Interests that had elected his party to 
office. The problem centered around the question of either repealing 
the Corn Laws, which were highly protective tariffs on all varieties of 
grain, or scaling down the tariffs, thus giving the classes access to 
an abundant and cheap supply of com. Though fu].ly aware of the risk 
that this program entailed for both himself and his party. Peel had no 
other choice but to back the measure.
Failure of the potato crop In Ireland caused Peel to secretly 
suggest to his Cabinet on October 31, that they had no other alterna­
tive than to repeal the C o m  Laws. After a series of lengthy Cabinet 
meetings In which Peel failed to gain the support of Lord Stanley and 
the Duke of Buccleuch, he decided it would be better to leave office 
before factions were formed within his party. On December the Prime 
Minister presented his resignation to the Queen, who then called upon 
Lord John Russell to form a government. However, Russell soon discovered 
that he could not form a government primarily because of the reluctance 
of Earl O r ^  to serve In a Cabinet In which Palmerston would hold the 
seals of the Foreign O f f i c e . U n d e r  the circumstances Lord John was
^^Arthur Christoper, ed.. The Letters of Queen Victoria A Selec­
tion from Her Majesty's Correspondence"Betimen t'he~Tears lB37~anïï Ï86î~~ 
Tïôndon, 19CH)7 II, 59% (Hereafter'cited as Christoper, Victoria's Ketters)
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forced to Inform the Queen on December 20^ that he was unable to serve 
her»^^ On the same day that Queen Victoria received Russell's letter 
she asked Sir Robert Peel to withdraw his resignation» Peel agreed to 
do this immediately g even though he must have realized that by resuming 
office he would, in effect, be helping to destroy the party that he had 
so carefully helped to build»
The fall of Peel's government was important to the Oregon ques- 
tion for several reasons» First, it convinced the United States that 
the pacific Peel government was very shaky and might be expected to fall 
at aty moment. A new government in England would undoubtedly include 
Palmerston as Foreign Minister» Judging by Palmerston's past record and 
his anti-American attitude, he would very likely be ranch more difficult 
to deal with than the conciliatory Aberdeen; therefore, the United States 
at the urging of the American Minister Mclane in London, began to think 
in terms of reaching a settlement on the Oregon boundary question before 
Peel was again ousted from power» This helped to facilitate a speedier 
settlement of the question» Charles Greville believed that one of the 
reasons that Aberdeen was so anxious to support the repeal of the Corn 
laws and help force their passage through the Parliament was because,
"his most earnest desire is to get over the Oregon affair as well as he 
can, and he knows that nothing will have so great an effect in America,
nothing tend so materially to prevalence of pacific counsels, as an
67announcement that the corn laws are going to be repealed» '
The fall of Peel's government and his return to office convinced
^^Rives, and Mexico, p» 111:»
67lbid.
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Russell that he mist now take a personal hand in helping to formulate 
the foreign policy of the Opposition. He realized that Palmerston, 
because of his vicious attacks on the Foreign Office and tord Aberdeen, 
had given people at home and abroad the impression that the Whigs were 
a war party. Because he had learned this and because he believed that 
he would soon have another chance to form a government, Russell tried 
to make amends, by speaking more favorably of the Oregon dispute, of 
President Polk and of the United States in general. The London Specta­
tor was quick to notice this dramatic change of position by Lord Russell, 
when t h ^  commented editorially on a speech he made on January 17, I8I46. 
In making the speech. Lord Russell constantly referred to the necessity 
of Great Britain's maintaining peace with all nations and emphasized 
the need for a successful conclusion of the Oregon question. The Spec­
tator made the following remarks concerning the speech:
One point on which he bestowed some pains is remarkable. He 
proposed the toast or sentiment of 'Peace with all nations,' 
and made a little lecture at Ministers on the necessity of 
bringing the Oregon negotiations with the United States to a 
peaceful issue. Can the man, you ask, who speaks in this way, 
seriously have meant to intrust the Foreign Office to Lord 
Palmerston? Why do you not see that that appointment is the 
very cause of the lecture? Lord John is doing his best to 
keep the war-like tendencies of his friend's method of diplo­
macy out of sight
Such was the political situation in Great Britain at the beginning 
of the year in which the Oregon question was solved. Peel had returned 
to office the head of a broken party, a party bent on having revenge be­
cause it felt that it had been betrayed by its leader who no longer
stood for protection. Lord Aberdeen, even though he was very anxious
^%erk, "British Politics," p. 6?2,
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to settle the Oregon qiestion, was hindered in doing so because he be- 
lievedj <'that his government could not concede what previous British 
governments had again and again refnsed,"^^ The Opposition, even though 
Lord Russell showed some sign of easing the pressure on the Foreign 
Office, still posed as a threat. Palmerston still attacked the Tories 
with relentless abandon that seemed to be increasing rather than de­
creasing. Much can be said for the political abilities of Lord Aberdeen, 
for within the next few months he was able to convince not only the 
Opposition, but Parliament and the people of England that an Oregon 
settlement based on the h9^ parallel should be highly acceptable to 
Great Britain and would not in any way infringe upon Britain"s honor 
or prestige.
GPlbid., p. 65%.
CHAPTER 7
SETTLmmr Œ  THE QRECŒ QHESTICN 
AND THE FAIL CF PEEL'S GC7ERNMMT
Lord Aberdeen, who was actively engaged in a program to educate 
the British public and Parliament early in the year of l8U6j used the 
news media of England in an attempt to influence the public to adopt a 
more conciliatory attitude in regard to the Oregon dispute, "His speci­
fic task," according to Professor Graebner, "was to convince them that 
British claime to Oregon were imperfect, that Oregon was not worth a 
dispute with the United States, that the British fur trade was 4ying, 
that the Columbia offered little security for heavy commerce, and that
70the United States had reasonable claims to good harbors on the Pacific»"
In attempting to educate the masses with his propaganda Aberdeen was 
subject to a good deal of pressure from many Englishmen who were con­
sistently anti-American, Among this group was Viscount Palmerston, who 
greatly exaggerated eveiything that he felt might be considered conces­
sion. Another important group that ho&ip contested Aberdeen's claims 
that Oregon was worthless and not worth fighting for, was those who had 
a vested interest in the Hudson's Bay Company. Fortunately for Lord 
Aberdeen's pacific policies. Governor Simpson of the Hudson's Bay Com­
pany in l8k^ ordered that the headquarters of the Company be moved from
 ̂Norman Graebner, Empire on the Pacific A Stu^y in American 
Continental Expansion (New York, 1^5577 pTUSHT TUereafter cited as 
Graebner, Empirê^ôn^he Pacific ).
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Fort Vancouver to Fort Victoria because of the aggressive character of
71maty of the American settlers in the l&lliamette Valley.' This move^ 
seemingly indicating that the Conqpaty no longer had vital interests in 
the area, made it easier for Aberdeen to convince Peel and the Cabinet 
that Great Britain could now give up the Columbia River. Fur reserves 
were nearly depleted in the Columbia Valley; therefore, the Compaty no 
longer needed the support of the British government to maintain its 
position in the territory. EVen though the Hudson's Bay Company had 
supported the American provisional government in Oregon, and was begin­
ning to feel the pressure of the American settlers, the Company was not 
forced out of the Columbia Valley by the Americans; rather it deemed it
wise to withdraw before serious friction developed. As late as l81t6,
72there were only eight American settlers north of the Coluiobia River, 
but it was anticipated that within a short time many more would be 
moving into the area.
Prior to the time when the Company moved its headquarters to 
Fort Victoria, the British had practically abandoned their claims to 
the land between the parallel and the Columbia River. This meant 
that the only land area actually in dispute in 181:6 was the quadrangle 
of land between the Columbia River and the 1:9° parallel, as the Polk 
administration had previously offered to accept the 1:9° parallel as 
the boundary line in July of 181:S. According to Aberdeen's calculations 
in 181:6 it was time to launch an all out campaign to secure a compromise
' ̂ %ay A. Billington, Westward Expansion A History of the Amer­
ican Frontier (New York, 191:97%
^^rederick Mark, "The Oregon Pioneers and the Boundary, " The
American Historical Review, XXIX (1921:), 683.
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settlement on the ij.9*̂ parallel. Another important factor that had to 
be taken into consideration by the Foreign Minister in his handling of 
the negotiations was the fact that even though the Peel government had 
returned to power on December 20, the government's tenure of office was 
subject to the whims of the Opposition party. If Aberdeen were to suc­
cessfully conclude the Oregon negotiations, he would have to do so before 
the "Whigs withdrew their support; it was apparent that such support might 
quickly be withdrawn as soon as the Parliament had passed the repeal of 
the C o m  Laws,
Time was of the essence, yet Aberdeen could not openly adopt the 
position of compromise on the k9̂  parallel because of Palmerston and 
others who refused to approve what they had previously branded as capi­
tulation. However, not all members of the Whig party were opposed to 
concession; as early as April 26, l8L^, Aberdeen discovered a strong 
supporter of his policies in the ranks of the Opposition, On that date, 
Nassau Senior, a high ranking Whig, who was considered to be a good 
economist and free trader wrote a lengthy editorial in the London Exam­
iner. Senior contended that the Oregon Country was worthless, that 
neither country had an ironclad claim to the territory, and that the 
only fair thing to do would be to divide the territory along the 2:9° 
parallels
All balancing of positive advantages to be obtained by the one 
nation or "ly the other on a partition is mere childishness.
The interruption of confidence for a single week costs more than 
the whole country is worth. A mere armament, , , , would cost 
more than a thousand times its value. , , , Whatever be Lord 
Aberdeen’s policy, the opposition will we trust, not add to its 
difficulties,
^%erk, "British Propaganda," p. 1:5,
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In later editorials Senior was often assisted by the previous American 
Minister in England, Edward Everett. Lord Aberdeen also gave behind- 
the-scenes directions and advice to Senior, but because of the unusual 
circumstances he could not openly play an active part in the proceed­
ings. During the next six months Senior wrote many blistering articles 
deriding the Opposition party for its behavior, while at the same time 
he strongly supported Aberdeen's pacific program. While Lord Aberdeen 
was delighted with such support, the Opposition took the opposite view 
and quickly accused Senior*of being disloyal to the interests of his 
party. They also accused him of having special economic interests in 
America, but Senior quickly denied this allegation and proved it to be 
untrue. That Senior was very unpopular with his own party was well 
known; the reasons were patently obvious in articles that he wrote 
during the summer and fall of l8L^. On August 27, he wrote the follow­
ing to the editor of the Edinburgh Review in defense of a previous 
article he had written.
I believe a war with America wd. produce a war with France, 
and that commercial ruin, national bankruptcy and revolution 
mi^it be the consequences. I believe that a war with America 
would produce worse consequences than pestilence or famine.
. . . The Whig party seemed to me to be readÿ to sacrifice 
peace to the wish to embarass their opponents, and the whole 
country seemed so totally to misunderstand the case that I 
feared they wd. entertain prejudices and advance pretensions 
from which there would be no receding.7^
Ah Opposition . . ., wrote Senior on October 30, which 
opposes indiscriminately is generally wrong. The Toid.es did 
this most wickedly. . . .  I hope we shall behave better in 
future; but I own that ny principal fears for the peace of the 
world arise from my fears of the misconduct of the French,
American, and English Oppositions& The three governments will 
behave well if they are allowed.75
7̂ -*lbld., p. h9o 7^%bid^^ p.
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Small wonder that Senior endeared himself to Aberdeen. The only problem 
was that during the period when Senior did most of his writing he was 
like a voice In the darkness; for It was during this period that antl- 
American feeling was very high in Great Britain and few people were 
willing to accept the philosophy of compromise.
Realizing that Aberdeen feared attacks from the Opposition, Edward 
Everett wrote Lord John Russell on December 28, asking him to grant 
immunity to the Conservative government so t h ^  could make the necessary 
concessions to settle the Oregon dispute. Everett said the government 
would not be able to effect a settlement unless the Opposition supported 
them?
Whether your ministers will accept It Is a question for them­
selves; but their course will no doubt In a great degree depend 
upon yours. If you choose to rally the public opinion of Eng- 
Imid against this basis of compromise. It will not be easy for 
SirIR. Peel and Lord Aberdeen to agree to It. . . . whether you 
id.ll encourage and stimulate the government to plunge Into a 
war, for the sake of adhering to the worst traditions of Lord 
Liverpool and Lord Csstlapeagh.?^
Lord John was Impressed by Everett's letter, probably because he real­
ized that he was going to have to change his criticisms of the govem- 
raent in preparation for the day when he would again be called upon to 
form his own ministry. However, Viscount Palmerston was not Impressed 
with such appeals, for he continued making anti-American and anti-French 
speeches as was his custom, using the Manchester Chronicle as his sound­
ing board. Eventually though, Palmerston came to realize that he would 
never be considered as a suitable prospect to hold the seals of the 
Foreign Office again unless he did something to recreate a better image
^^erk, "British Bolltios," p. 656,
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of himself. %  February of l8Ii6 even Palmerston had oeased his attacks 
on the government’s Oregon policy.
On Janoaiy 3, 181)6; Lord Aberdeen scored a great triumph when the 
London Times, England’s most respected and widely read newspaper, com­
pletely reversed its previously uncompromising attitude and came out 
strongly for compromise and conciliation, a reversal which helped sway 
public opinion to Aberdeen’s way of thinking. The Times proposed a 
settlement that was basically the same as the draft treaty that Aberdeen 
sent to the United States five months later:
That there are men in American who long for war with Great Bri­
tain is, we fear, no less true than that there are men in this 
country to whom war with the United States would be by no means 
unwelcome. But . . .  in both countries the real strength of 
public opinion is arrayed against a belligerent policy. The 
relations of commerce— the affections of kindred— identity of 
origin, of language, and laws—  . . .  and the common deference 
to the same principles of moral action— bind the two nations 
together by ties which it would be atrocious to sever by the 
sword. We are two people, but we are one family. We have 
fought, but we have reconciled.??
This editorial, which was well received by the public, represents a
turning point in the British attitude on the Oregon question. From
this time forward, Lord Aberdeen received a great deal less criticism
and a good deal more support, not only from his own party but the
Opposition as well. Many Americans, Including McLane and Everett,
correctly Interpreted the editorial In the Times as being a reflection
of the government’s views and this tended to ease the tensions between
the two countries.
When Parliament opened on January 23, 181)6, It soon became apparent
^%arry C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States A
of Anglo-Amerlcan Relations 1783-19^Z"(New Tork%"ï^3F), p. 1)127
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that the Conservative party had not forgiven the Prime Mnister for his 
support of the legislation to repeal the Corn Laws. The Protectionists 
refused to admit that the emergency in Ireland warranted even a tempor­
ary suspension of the Corn Laws, let alone their complete repeal. There 
was some question as to the length of time it would take for the govern­
ment to fall, but there was no doubt that its days were numbered. Dis­
raeli stated with clarity the situation when he commented upon Peel's 
return to offices "The field was lost," he said, "but at any rate there
*70
should be retribution, . . . During the opening speeches of the
new session of Parliament it first appeared as though Peel would not be 
attacked; after the usual formalities were taken care of Lord George 
Bentinck and Disraeli commenced to attack the Arime Minister. The former 
stated that he kept "horses in three countries, and they ^supporters of
the Corn Law repeal] tell me I shall save $00 a year by free trade.
79I don't care for that; what I cannot bear is being sold." The infer- 
ence was quite clear: Peel had sold out; he had betrayed his party; no 
matter what the cost might be, the Prime Minister must pay it. Even 
though Bentinck played an important part in the harassment of the govern­
ment, the real leader of the rebellion was Benjamin Disraeli, a man who 
had openly rebelled against the Prime Minister for not having been in­
cluded in the Cabinet of 1 8 ^ 1 . According to his most definitive 
biographer, "Disraeli no doubt realized that, with all its apparent
^^Tilby, Lord John Bussell, p. 63.
^^E. L. Woodward, The Age of Reform, I8l$-l870 (Oxford, 1939), p. II8.w 01 i 
(Hereafter cited as Woodward, Age of~Reform)'
^%onypenny, Disraeli, II, 118-119. Based on letters between
Peel and Disraeli on”sipt73 and 7, l81j,l.
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strengths ' the Peel Ministry was a house built upon sand. At all events* 
while it stood his path was barred* and he now determined to advance to 
the assault upon it alone* to strike openly and persistently* . . . and 
having determined to strike* he characteristically chose to strike at 
the highest* at the Prime Minister himself."^ The activities and 
attacks of Disraeli during the next six months were a very important 
factor in stirring up the Conservative party and causing them to help 
turn Peel out of office in June. Even though things looked rather dark 
and bleak for the Peel Ministry because of these attacks* there was one 
bright spot, lord John Bussell* in trying to Improve the reputation of 
his party* stopped attacking the government's Oregon policy. Evidence 
of his change of attitude is found In the early debates on January 23* 
Tshen he publicly rebuked Pakenham for rejecting the American offer of 
the previous July. confess," Lord John told the House* "I think
that was a hasty proceeding upon the part of the Representative of Her
8?Majesty." Such a statement by the leader of the Opposition could 
mean only one thing* he was publicly announcing that there may have 
been or might even be* a reasonable settlement made using the k9^ paral­
lel as the boundary line. This complete volte-face on the part of the 
Opposition leader proved very encouraging to Lord Aberdeen.
Surprisingly, the Oregon question was only mentioned twice during 
the first month that the Parliament was in session (though both Houses 
in the United States hotly debated the possibilities of ending joint 
occupation* which the President had asked be ended in his annual message
^Ibld.* p. 305.
82Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (London* 181$6)* LXXXIII, 152.
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the preceding December). On January 29, Lord Brougham asked Lord Aber­
deen if he had heard of or seen any of the globes being made in England 
that had the Oregon boundary placed on them “according to the American 
doctrine?Aberdeen replied in the negative, claiming that he had no 
knowledge of any such globes being made in the country. It was finally 
determined that a local globe maker, in filling an order for a globe 
for Edward Everett when he had been minister in London, out of courtesy 
placed the boundary along the W  parallel. When the question had 
been clarified, the House passed it off without a second thought and 
many of the members felt that the ■whole episode was quite humorous. It 
is doubtful that Lord Aberdeen, who was quite sensitive about questions 
relating to Oregon, appreciated the humor of the situation.
American congressional debates over Oregon during the month of 
Januaiy made it appear as though a solution to the problem would not be 
possible unless Great Britain was prepared to make large concessions to 
comply with the extreme American demands; therefore. Lord Aberdeen was 
pleased to learn from American Minister McLane late in February that 
while, "the President himself would accept nothing less than the whole 
of Oregon, he would, should Great Britain offer the forty-ninth paral­
lel as a boundary, refer the proposition to the Senate for its advice. 
McLane had been authorized by Secretary of State James Buchanan to pass 
this information on to Aberdeen in an informal manner. Buchanan also 
wrote McLane that it was quite likely that the Congress would give 
notice to end the joint occupation; therefore, if the British had a
G^Ibid., p.
^^cGormack, James K. Polk, p. 58^.
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proposition they wished to make, they should make it immediately» "Th%r 
have not an hour to lose if they desire a peaceful termination of this 
controversy» It is manifestg  that the British Government should at once 
present their u l t i m a t u m » Secretary Buchanan^ wanting to be sure that 
there was no misunderstanding on the other side of the Atlanticj in re­
gard to the President's new position, wrote McLane on February 26, and 
assured him that any British proposal offering the parallel as a 
boundary would in all probability be acceptable as "Polk was reacÿ to 
retreat by throwing the burden of the decision upon the Senate.
Lord Aberdeen, in possession of this pertinent information, was 
able to view the Oregon dispute in a much more carefree manner than his 
colleagues in the Parliament were able to do. Aberdeen had the virtual 
assurance of the American government that a compromise on the ii9° 
parallel would be perfectly acceptable. As if this were not enough, 
it is now known that early in February, Russell informed Aberdeen that 
he felt Britain could give up the Columbia River. While there are no 
records available of the exchange between the Opposition leader and the 
Foreigi Minister on this subject, it is apparent from the contents of
a letter written by Russell to Palmerston on February 3° opinion
upon the whole is that we may well and with due regard to our own inter­
ests give up the Columbia river, and I have let Aberdeen know privately 
that he will have no opposition from me on that g r o u n d . Russell
adopted a course which he felt would be most prudent for the Whigs to
®^Reeves, American Diplomacy, p. 260. 
®^emis, Am. Secretaries of State, 7, 261. 
GTMerk, "British Politics," p. 658.
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follow; he undoubtedly hoped that Palmerston would also pursue the same 
course. The desired results were obtained, for by early spring even 
Palmerston had fallen into line publicly on Aberdeen's foreign policy.
In late February, Lord Aberdeen decided to adopt a sterner policy 
in regard to Oregon, feeling as he did that as the crisis became more 
critical the chances of a settlement became more Imminent. He led Louis 
McLane to believe that Great Britain was preparing her naval strength 
for a possible war with the United States. It had become common know­
ledge in England that the navy was outfitting a large number of ships. 
When the opportunity presented itself during an interview with Lord 
Aberdeen, the American Minister inquired as to the purpose of the ex­
tensive military preparations. Aberdeen explained that as long as the 
Oregon negotiations were deadlocked and the President continued to dis- 
courage aqy new proposition on the basis of compromise he had not opposed 
measures for the defense of Canada or for possible offensive operations. 
When McLane reported this to his own government he said that he under- 
stood from Lord Aberdeen that the measures would include, "the immediate 
equipment of thirty sail of the line, besides steamers and other vessels
QO
of war." The dispatch created quite a stir in Polk's Cabinet; it 
made the United States racognize the possibiliiy of soon fighting a war 
with not only Mexico but also Great Britain.
An incident which occurred in Februaiy also made it easier for 
Lord Aberdeen to offer the h9° parallel as a compromise line; this was 
the return of Lt. William Peel, the younger brother of the Prime Minis­
ter, from the Oregon territory. Lt. Peel had been sent to Oregon by
^^Pratt, U. ^  Foreign Policy, p. 2l5.
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the government to ascertain the true state of affairs In the territory. 
His report emphasized the growing influence of the Americans in politi­
cal matters and stressed the feeling of helplessness on the part of the 
Hudson's Bay Company to prevent the Americans from making further ad­
vances in the territory. According to one writer, "%th this knowledge 
in their possession, the British government was politically in a posi­
tion to recede from the principles of Canning's boundary without loss 
of parliamentary or popular support."®^ It was apparent that the United 
States was too firmly entrenched in the Oregon territory to relinquish 
any land south of the U9° parallel. Aberdeen now had the evidence he 
needed to prove to any skeptics who might still oppose concession that 
failure to concede would of necessity lead to war. That there were 
many who believed that the tense situation could easily lead to war is 
shown by the activities of the Hudson's Bay Compacy in l8i|6. War ap- 
peared so likely in the territory that the Company sent an agent to San 
Francisco and the Sandwich Islands in March of I8L6 to make arrangements
for obtaining supplies for their posts in the event that the Americans
90seized their farm lands. It was only natural that the Company, be­
cause of its close proximity to the Americans in Oregon and not being 
aware of the secret assurances that each government was giving the other, 
should be most anxious to take precautionary measures to safeguard its
interests.
Public indignation in England once more rose to great heights 
during the month of March because of the Oregon dispute. Members of
®%chafer, The Pacific Northwest, p. l8L. 
^%ancroft. History of Oregon, XXIX, 573.
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the Parliament found it impossible to accept Aberdeen's assurances that 
the negotiations were going well. This attitude is easily understand­
able, however, as the only source of information they had access to 
were American newspapers; such papers were not always too reliable as 
they tended to overemphasize the American claims and belittle the Bri­
tish claims. The Earl of Clarendon, a close personal friend of the 
Foreign Mnister, though a member of the Opposition, had been asked by 
Aberdeen to inquire in the Lords as to the state of the negotiations;
Aberdeen wanted the opportunity to speak on the Oregon situation and
91reassure the Parliament that all was going well, Thus, on March 17, 
Clarendon, speaking in the House of Lords, asked Aberdeen to place be­
fore the Parliament the correspondence relative to the Oregon question. 
In playing his part perfectly, he reminded Aberdeen that the subject 
of Oregon had only been discussed twice during the session. Clarendon 
felt that the Americans were misconstruing this apparent lack of dis­
cussion and bluster on the part of the Parliament. Such an impression 
should not be allowed to go unchallenged:
cannot disguise from ourselves that the two countries appear 
to be gradually, but involuntarily, drifting towards war, I 
think, therefore, that the time is come when ny noble Friend 
may, without indiscretion, be asked to lay upon your Lordships' 
Table such correspondence, . . . as it may not be for the 
public interest to withhold
Unfortunately, Lord Aberdeen was in no position to state publicly that
President Polk, through his minister in London, had virtually assured
him that a compromise based on the parallel would be referred to
^ Charles C. Greville, The Greville Memoirs A Journal of the 
Reign of Queen Victoria from iB^y-TH^TTLondon, 15857,II, 376, (Here­
after cited as Greville, MemoirsJ,
^Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (London, 1886), LXXXIV, 1112, 
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the Senate, where in all probability it would be approved. Polk was 
alrea<^ subject to a great deal of criticism at home from the W '  
men who were becoming suspicious of his intentions^ therefore, in order 
not to offend Polk and cause him to reverse his position the Foreign 
Minister answered Clarendon*s question in the same manner that the House 
had heard so many times before. He felt that he must withhold a large 
portion of the correspondence between himself and Pakenhara because mak­
ing such correspondence public could have serious consequences and en­
danger the negotiations. If the Lords desired copies of American news­
papers that discussed the issue, he would be glad to produce them, even 
though, in his opinion, they did not present a true picture of the 
present state of the negotiations. Lord Aberdeen concluded his part 
of the debate by presenting a rather optimistic summary of the situation 
and this, of course, was the reason he had asked Clarendon to open the 
discussions
I cannot bring nyself to believe that any reasonable doubt can 
remain of our being able to bring this matter to a satisfactory 
termination. I have no doubt of the sincere desire of both 
Governments to arrive at this result; and I trust that ity noble 
Friend will not think me guilty of any unoourteous conduct if 
I decline to inform him of the steps, which, in the present 
juncture of affairs, Her Majesty's Government may think proper 
to take . . .  no effort will be spared, consistently with 
national honour, to bring this question to an early and peace­
ful termination.93
No other discussion followed Aberdeen’s speech, except for a short 
statement by Lord Ashburton who indicated that he concurred completely 
with the Foreign Minister. Once again, the Parliament, even though the 
situation looked very bad to many of the members, was willing to take
93ibid., pp. 1117-1118,
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Aberdeen's word for it that everything was under control and that a 
solution to the problem would soon be forthcoming.
On the same day that Aberdeen was asked to present information
in the lords. Peel was bitterly attacked in the Commons by Disraeli for
changing his position on protectionism. During the last f^w months of
Peel's tenure of office, Disraeli seldom failed to attack the Prime
Minister when the opportunity presented itself; he did not want Parlia- 
ment to forget what Peel had done and this day was no exception, Dis­
raeli first reviewed Peel's great career as a protectionist, exemplified 
him as the great leader and speaker of his party, a leader who had now 
changed his position and in so doing had betrayed his party. He claimed 
that peel had forgotten his obligations when he began to work for the 
repeal of the Corn Daws, ", . . For nyself, I care not what may be the 
result. Dissolve, if you please, the Parliament ;you have betrayed, and 
appeal to the people, who, I believe, mistrust you. For me there re­
mains this at least--the opportunity of expressing thus publicly my 
belief that a Conservative Government is an Organised Rypocrigy,"^^ 
Disraeli's comment about dissolving the Parliament was made because it 
was common knowledge that many of Peel's supporters were urging him to 
let the people decide. The Prime Minister steadfastly refused to take 
his case to the people even though he must have known that he had a good 
chance of succeeding if he were to do this.
Three days later Mr, Borthwick asked the Prime Minister to present 
the correspondence relative to the Oregon question before the Commons, 
Borthwick believed that the absence of bluster and bravado in Great
9blbid,, DZZEIII, 1022,
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Britain was being interpreted in the United States as being an indica­
tion of timidity and fear in regard to Oregon, He felt that Ehgland 
should publicly express the feeling that she would go to war if neces­
sary to protect her interests in North America. Sir Robert answered 
Borthwick by once again explaining to the members that the negotiations 
were progressing in a satisfactory manner and that he did not believe 
that any misconstruction had been placed on British comments by the 
Americans. "I do not think," he claimed, "that there would be any pub- 
lic advantage, in the present state of the differences existing between 
this country and the United States as to the Oregon territory, in making 
any communication to this House; and it is not the intention of Her
95]Majesty*s Government to make any such communication," Lord John
Rüssëll, in keeping with his new policy, offered support to the cause:
1 wish to state, so far as I am concerned, I have no wish to 
ask for apy Papers until the right hon. Gentleman can state 
that the negotiations have reached such a point, , . . , as to 
induce him to think that the time is arrived when the Papers 
relating to those negotiations should be laid before the 
House. If the right hon. Gentleman withholds these Papers,
I can only 8^^ that I shall not press nor ask for them until 
the whole negotiations shall have been completed and until 
then I shall give no opinion on the subject,
The inability of Lord John Russell to form a government in December of 
l8b5, cannot be overemphasized for he not only abstained from criticiz­
ing the government's foreign policy in Oregon but also saw to it that 
none of his followers, including Palmerston, did either, Whenever the 
discussion in Parliament concerned foreign policy Palmerston sat as 
though he were a mute. The change was so obvious that the London Times
P^Tbid., LIXZIV, 1278. 
9*Ibid., p, 1279.
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commented upon it shortly after the Peel government had resigned:
« . o The lesson of last December was not lost npon so acute 
a statesman as Lord Palmerston. He perceived as quickly as 
his opponents, that a Minister whose accession to power is 
viewed with consternation, distrust, and hostility by every 
Cabinet in the world, was ipso=facto disqualified from main­
taining those amicable relations with other States which he 
must desire to cultivate, and from exercising that influence 
which he ought to possess. . . .^7
The very instability of the Peel government made Lord Aberdeen's task
easier in Oregon, as both Russell and Palmerston were looking forward
to the time when they could withdraw their support from the Conservative
government and calmly take over the reins of the government themselves.
As the American Congress continued to debate the termination of 
joint-occupation during the month of March, British politicians lost 
interest in the Oregon question and became concerned with two acts of 
legislation that the Tory government was trying to push through the 
Parliament: the famous Corn Law repeal and the Irish Coercion Bill. The 
latter bill had been presented ty the Peel government in an attempt to 
curb agrarian crime in Ireland. The Irish, who deeply resented the 
British absentee landlord system and the poverty that they were forced 
to accept and live with, had resorted to a savage code of reprisals 
against the landowners in their country. Theft, looting, intimidation 
and even murder were used by the peasants to protect their interests.
The British government could not tolerate such a wave of crime, so the 
Tïime Minister asked that a Coercion Act be passed to empower the Irish 
government to appoint additional police magistrates at local expense. 
"When the Coercion Act was first introduced the government did not
^^Merk, "British Polities,*’' p. 673° Quoted from the Edinburgh 
Review, June 29, 1816.
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anticipate a great deal of opposition except from O'Connell and his
Irish supporter8j who would naturally oppose such legislation» In early
March the Coercion Act passed through the Lords by a healthy margin,
where it had received support from both Miigs and Protectionists» The
bill had its first reading in the House of Commons on March 30, where
it soon became apparent that the government might have a great deal more
difficuliy in securing its passage. Disraeli regarded the Coercion Act
as a weapon to turn the government out of office» He knew that the
Irish would naturally oppose the bill with every means available to
them; he also knew that maqy of the legislators would be adverse to
supporting any type of repressive measures and even though the Whigs
had supported the bill in the Lords, he believed that they might be
persuaded to reverse their position and renounce their support to help
overthrow the government» Obstructionist tactics succeeded so well
that the bill did not have its second reading until June 2$» Charles
Greville wrote a prophetic observation in his diary on March 29, when
he accurately summarized the position of the government.
At present, . . » , Peel holds the office for the sole purpose 
of carrying the [repeal of the Corn] Bill. The Whigs are 
guarding him, while he is doing this work, ready to turn 
against him the moment he has done it, and then, this great 
contest over, the Protectionists will either join the Whigs 
in their first onset, or leave him to his fate» They do not 
care what happens so long as they can break up this Govern­
ment; , . . Revenge is their sole object»98
Meanwhile, as the Parliament became more enmeshed in the delaying
tactics of the Irish faction, the United States Congress came closer to 
reaching an agreement on the end of joint occupation. British Minister
98,Greville, Mmoirs, p. 380.
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Bakenhara wrote Lord Aberdeen, on the same day that the Coercion Act was
introduced in the Commons, that during the course of the Congressional
debates one thing had become apparents
. , . It seems to have become a received opinion among even the 
most moderate members of the Senate, that the claims of the 
United States extend fully to the parallel of b9, which they
consider ought to be insisted on as the basis of any arrange­
ment.
So certain is this, that the advocates of a peaceful settle­
ment of the question are now universally designated as h9 men, 
in contradistinction of those who go for the whole of Oregon 
even at the risk of war, and are called Sh 1+0 men.°°
Pakenham's observations were quite sound. Early in April it had become
increasingly clear that the Senate would approve a compromise based upon
the 1+9° parallels the majority wanted nothing more and would accept
nothing less. A poem that appeared early in the month in the New York
Herald aptly expressed what it felt was the general feeling of the
Senate in regard to Oregon:
This is the line that we define.
The line for Oregon;
And if this basis you decline,
We go the "whole or none,"
Wb go the "whole or none," Lord John,
Up to the Russian line.
Then if your wise, you'll "compromise"
On number forty nine.100
For all practical purposes the governments were very close to
being in agreement on the Oregon question from February on. Outwardly
the situation looked very bad to the public and to the members of the
legislative branches of both countries, but Aberdeen had had constant
reassurances from McLane that a British proposal based on the 1+9°
99willlams, American Diplomacy, p. 199. 
^°%raebner. Empire on the Pacific, p. 136,
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parallel, would be accepted by the Senate, and the American Minister 
also reassured his own government that the British would soon make such 
an offer. On April 3, McLane wrote Buchanan and informed him that he 
felt the British government's desire to gain time stemmed in part "from 
a desire to prepare the public in various ways for a basis of partition 
which the Ministers have made up their minds to offer. . . The
major problem in both countries now seemed to be the task of tearing 
down the artificial fences of national prestige and honor that each 
country had built up early in the negotiations.
The joint resolution passed both houses of the United States 
Congress on April 23 proclaiming that the President was authorized at 
his discretion to give notice to Great Britain that the Convention of 
1827 (joint occupation) would end one year from the date he notified 
the British government of its termination. Included in the preamble of 
the announcement was a phrase stating the hope that . . the attention 
of the governments of the two countries may be more earnestly directed 
to the adoption of all proper measures for a speecÿ and amicable adjust­
ment of the differences and disputes in regard to the said territory. 
Polk personally objected to the preamble, which he felt had been watered 
down too much, but this did not halt the inevitable. On April 27, 
Buchanan forwarded the resolution to Louis McLane, who was to notify 
the British government. McLane was instructed to emphasize that the 
resolution did not mean an end of the negotiations, as the United States
l*^%erk, "British Propaganda," p. 60.
IC^George Mnot, Statutes at Large and Treaties of the United 
States of America (Boston, 1551)
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would consider any suitable proposal Great Britain might wish to make, 
When Lord Aberdeen was officially notified through the American Minister 
that the treaty had been abrogated, he Immediately drew up a draft, in 
treaty form to send to the United States. He had refrained from making 
such an offer at an earlier date as he wanted to wait until the Congress 
had finished their debates so he would know exactly how the question 
stood. On May l8, the Foreign Minister sent the draft treaty to Richard 
Pakenham, who was informed that the wording of the articles might be 
altered but the substance must be preserved. "Without calling this 
convention an ultimatum," wrote Aberdeen, "it will, in fact, be so far 
as you are concerned; although you will, of course, send home for con­
sideration ary proposition which may be made at variance with these 
conditions.
On the same day that lord Aberdeen sent his instructions to 
Pakenham, the American Minister in London wrote Secretary of State James 
Buchanan and informed him that Pakenham would soon receive new instruc­
tions from lord Aberdeen to propose the parallel as the compromise 
line and that he believed the Peel Ministry would resign before the end 
of June. If the latter were true and the British proposal were not 
accepted promptly, the new government might not so readily agree to such 
favorable t e r m s T h i s  letter was of the utmost importance because 
it definitely influenced the members of Polk's Cabinet and caused them
lO^Miller, Treaties, p. 79.
^^^Blair and Rives, The Congressional Globe for the First Session, 
Twenty-ninth Congresss Speeches and Important State Papers, lBl|.̂ -18lt6 ~ 
(Washington, l51;6y7~p. 1171. Quoted from Mclane’s letter to Buchanan 
on May 18, Î8L6. (Hereafter cited as Blair and Rives, Appendix to the 
Congressional Globe).
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to advise the President to send the treaty to the Senate. The vision 
of Palmerston returning to the Foreign Office did not appeal to those 
in America who seriously desired a peaceful settlement of the Oregon 
question.
The members of Parliament, as was Aberdeen’s custom, were not 
informed by their government that notice had been given by the United 
States to end the joint occupation. On May 29, Mr. Hume inquired of 
the Prime Minister in the Commons, if it were true, as the Americans 
claimed, that the President had been authorized to abrogate the conven­
tion? Peel replied in the affirmative, stating that the notice had been 
given ”. . .  with the view of leading to an amicable adjustment of the 
differences and disputes in respect to this t e r r i t o r y . Peel failed 
to mention, however, that Lord Aberdeen had already sent a proposed 
draft treaty to the United States offering the k9̂  parallel as a com­
promise boundary line. Once again, the Parliament was left in the dark 
as to the true state of affairs in Oregon.
On June 3, McLane's letter outlining the new British proposal 
was presented to the President by Secretary Buchanan. Polk felt certain 
that the draft was unsatisfactory and must certainly be rejected; he was 
particularly opposed to the clause that guaranteed free navigation of 
the Columbia River to the Hudson’s Bay Company. Polk’s thoughts about 
the treaty are clearly recorded in his diary, on the same night he wrote, 
"If I reject it absolutely and make no other proposition the probable 
result will be war. If I submit it to the Senate and they should advise 
its acceptance I shall be bound by their advice yet I should do so
^^^Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates (London, l8L6), LXXXFI, lii2li.
82
r e l u c t a n t l y , A f t e r  a series of lengthy Cabinet discussions Presi­
dent Polk, on June 10, acting upon the advice of his Cabinet, forwarded 
the treaty draft to the Senate with the following terse comments
opinion and ny action on the Oregon question were fully 
made known to Congress in By annual message of the 2d of 
December last and the opinions therein expressed remain un­
changed.
Should the Senate, by the constitutional majority required 
for the ratification of treaties, advise the acceptance of 
this proposition, or advise it with such modifications as 
t h ^  may upon full deliberation deem proper, I shall conform 
By action to their advice* Should the Senate, however, de­
cline by such constitutional majority to give such advice or
to express an opinion on the subject, I shall consider it By
duty to reject the offer,10?
Polk refused to take a definite stand, either for or against the draft;
he simply passed it on to the Senate*
The Senate wasted little time in debating the merits of Aberdeen’s 
draft treaty. On the second day after Polk had sent the treaty to the
Senate thqy "voted to accept the British proposal by a vote of 38-12, two
more than the bxxthirds vote which Polk had required in his message.
In voicing their approval of the treaty the Senate relieved Polk of the 
responsibility of making the decisions
The treaty was clearly not a party measure. It was in 
accordance neither with the Democratic platform of l8hb nor 
with the president’s inaugural nor his annual message* The 
president had declined all responsibility for it. It was 
the Senate’s treaty. Because Polk refused to assume the 
responsibility of war with Great Britain, for the disruption 
of his party and for the failure of his administration— and 
these apparently would have been the results of rejecting 
the British offer.1^9
James Polk, The Diary of a President, I81i5“l8ii9 (New York, 
195%), p. a U k . -----------------------------------
107James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers 
of the Presidents (New York, 1897T7*TÏ7’'23ÔÔ*
^®%lair and Rives, Appendix to the Congressional Globe, p. Il68*
^^%* L. Schuyler, "Polk and the Oregon Compromise," Political 
Science Quarterly, XXVI (1911), Ü6l*
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The Senate vote also reflected the outside factors that entered into 
the situation. The United States had been involved in a war with Mex­
ico for over a month; it had also become evident that Peel's Ministry 
might fall at any time, thus making peaceful settlement much more 
difficult. On June 1$, the treaty was formally signed by the represent- 
atives of both governments^ three days later the Senate officially 
approved the treaty by a vote of Ll-lL.^^^ On August 1816 the treaty 
was officially proclaimed by both countries.
As the Oregon dispute was rapidly being solved in the United 
States during the spring of 1816, the Peel Ministry was just as rapidly 
losing strength in Great Britain. When the government returned to 
office after the failure of Russell to form a government in December 
of the preceding year, the Prime Minister had undertaken as his major 
task the repeal of the Corn laws. He had anticipated a great deal of 
difficulty even though he would have the support of the Opposition; 
however, it was not the Corn law repeal, but the Irish Coercion Act 
that finally caused the government to fall. On June 8, Disraeli suc­
ceeded in convincing lord George Bentinck that the only chance they had 
to turn the government out was to oppose the Coercion Bill. Bentinck 
remained undicided even as the first speeches were made; he feared that 
if they tried to put the government out and failed it would place them 
in a very awkward position. However, a short time later Bentinck, hav­
ing made his decision, secured the floor and made his speech which was 
to set the stage for the fall of the government. He reminded Peel that 
he was now what he had always declared he would never consent to be:
ÏÏ^Blalr and Rives, Appendix to The Congressional Globe, p. Il69«
8it
"A minister on Sufferance, supported by none but his forty paid janis­
saries and some seventy other renegades, one half of whom, while sup-
111porting him, expressed their shame of doing so." Bentinck claimed
that the government had shown that the bill was not urgently needed
when they allowed it to drag along for months and had not quickly pushed
it through. The result was that the Protectionists would no longer
support the bill.
Though he was urged to dissolve the Parliament Peel refused, even
though he obviously expected to be defeated because of the Coercion Bill.
In a memorandum to the Duke of Wellington on June 21, he explained the
position of his governments "Depend upon it, he wrote, that we shall
not pass the Irish Bill into law. If we have a small majority on the
first division, it will give us no assurance, and, in my opinion, no
hope of success. We shall be defeated by concerted delay, if we cannot
112be defeated by numbers."
On the night of June 25, the Corn Laws were repealed in the House
of Lords. On the same night the government was defeated in the Commons
when a division was held on the Coercion Bill. Originally the bill had
only received major opposition from the Radicals, or Irish, but on the
division over seventy Protectionists voted with the Opposition to defeat
113the government by a margin of seventy-three votes. Peel, though urged 
to dissolve the Parliament rather than resign, refused and indicated his
^^%onypenny, Disraeli, I, 793.
Justin McCarthy, Sir Robert Peel (New York, 1891), p. l5?.
l^^Donald Southgate, The Passing of the Whigs 1632-1886 (London, 
1962), p. 131. --- --
displeasure with the party systemo "There must be an end," he told 
Richard Gobdenj "to the juggle of parties* the mere representatives of 
traditions, and some man must of necessity rule the state through its 
governing class. The Reform Bill decreed it; the passing of the Corn 
Bill has realized it."Hk
Four days after the defeat of his government, Sir Robert Peel 
officially announced his resignation before the House of Commons. He 
had turned against the rank and file of his party, as well as the leis­
ured class. His last speech revealed some of the bitterness that he 
must have felts
To have ;rour own way, and to be for five;years the Minister 
of this country in the House of Commons is quite enough for 
any man's strength. . . . and at the same time to be the tool 
of a party, that is to say, to adopt the opinions of men who 
have not access to your knowledge, and could not profit by it 
if they had, who spend their time in eating and drinking, 
hunting and shooting, gambling, horse racing, and so forth-- _ 
would be an odious servitude, to which I never will s u b m i t
Peel left office a bitter and broken man, a man who never forgave what
his party had done to him.
The only bright spot of the day occurred in the House of Lords
when lord Brougham asked Lord Aberdeen if the reports in the American
papers were true that the Oregon dispute had been settled. Confirming
the American newspaper account. Lord Aberdeen very happily read the
Lords a letter, received only that morning from Pakenham which announced
that the United States government had ratified the t r e a t y . The
Oregon question was now history.
^^^Monypenny, Disraeli, I, 800.
ll^Hansard's Parliamentaiy Debates (London, I8L6), LXXXVII, lOLO-^S,
^^^Ibld., p. 1037.
CHAPIER 71
THE OREGON CONTROVERSY IN PERSPECTIVE
The eventual settlement of the long standing Oregon controversy 
proved to be mutually acceptable and advantageous to Great Britain and 
the United States. Both nations were obviously quite relieved when the 
dispute was settled in a satisfactory manner, for each government was 
engrossed in far more serious matters. The United States had become 
involved in a rather unpopular war with Mexico, while Great Britain was 
faced with the fall of a government because of the Coercion Act.
Many hlBtorians tend to simplify and isolate the more obvious 
factors that contributed to the eventual settlement of the Oregon dis­
pute. More often than not American historians attribute the settlement 
to the war with Mexico and the remote possibility that Great Britain 
might support the Mexican g o v er nm en t. wh il e  these factors no doubt 
Influenced many Americans, it is unlikely that they represent the only 
or even principal reason that the Senate so quickly approved Lord Aber­
deen's draft treaty without changing a single word. The very fact that 
the majority of the Oregon supporters settled for the h9° parallel was 
no doubt a reflection that they felt that this was the greatest conces­
sion Great Britain would be able or willing to make. To demand more from 
the shaky Peel government would have been foolhardy, for it might have 
led to war. Such a war would have completely disrupted Anglo-American
H^Such authorities as Philip Klein and Harry Allen cite the 
Mexican War as the main reason for settlement of the Oregon question. 
Numerous others like Wilbur Jones consider the Mexican War to be but one 
of several major factors that Influenced the settlement.
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trade. Considerable emphasis has been placed on the fact that Great 
Britain exported more of her finished products to the United States than
to any other country; in the event of a major war the United States would
not only have lost her greatest consumer of raw materials, but would un­
doubtedly have once again had a major portion of her merchant fleet 
rotting in port because of a British blockade. American commercial 
interests were not anxious to have such a situation develop, as t h ^  
well remembered the plight of American shipping during the earlier Anglo- 
American wars. This, then, was a major factor in influencing American 
acceptance of the treaty.
A second factor of equal importance was the inpending fall of 
the Peel government. By the time it had become apparent in the spring
of I8L6 that the duration of the government was limited to a matter of
d^s, the Oregon negotiations had reached the point where a satisfactoiy 
settlement had to be made, or the state of the negotiations would have 
reverted back to the same unsatisfactory status they were in when lord 
Aberdeen had become Foreign Minister, The United States had no desire 
to enter into negotiations with a man of Palmerston*s reputation, lord 
Aberdeen himself believed that this was the reason his draft was accepted 
so quickly:
I entertain no doubt that it was not the apprehension of any
embarrassment in consequence of the Mexican War which led to 
this decision; but that it was entirely owing to the impending 
change of the administration in this country, and a desire to 
settle the whole affair with us before our departure.
Tear of a war with Great Britain, loss of foreign markets and trade,
economic disruption and chaos, plus the sincere desire on the part of
^^^Miller, Treaties, p. 8I. Quoted from a letter from Aberdeen
to Pakenham on June~307TFii6,
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many Americans to peacefully settle the Issue before the Peel government 
fell from power appear to constitute the main American reasons for set- 
tling when they did.
The British government.was also Influenced by several important 
considerations. The most important single factor to influence the 
thinking of the government was the desire of both Peel and Aberdeen to 
restore amicable relations between the United States and Great Britain. 
It might truly be said that this government was dedicated to peaceful 
pursuits and would not allow itself to be swayed from these goals even 
though President Polk and the W  men had often made such a pacific
course very difficult to follow. There is no doubt that Peel's Mnistry 
was also influenced by other immediate problems; among these were the 
acute food shortages in Ireland and the need for American grain to help 
make the new%y adopted free trade policies work. Another factor of 
importance was the vulnerable position of Canada in the event of a rup­
ture with the United States over Oregon. "War with the United States 
would endanger not only Oregon^ but Canada, which would inevitably 
become the main object of attack, and the stakes were not worth such a 
major risk."^^^ The withdrawal of the Hudson's Bay Compary from the 
Columbia Valley in l8L^, an incident that undoubtedly reflected govern­
ment policy, reflects the British desire to maintain peaceful relations 
with the United States. While the other considerations were Important, 
they were still ends to a goal, and that goal was peace with the United 
States.
'^l^Edgar W„ Mclnnis, The Unguarded Frontier A History of Ameri° 
can-Canadian Relations (New York, "l9Ï;S')'7 ' ' ~
Serious study of the Oregon dispute leads one to believe that 
the entire problem stemmed from a question of national prestige and 
honor. Both countries were willing to compromise on a settlement, but 
each government found Itself In such a position that the acceptance of 
the 1:9° parallel as boundary was made very difficult because It would 
be labeled "capitulation" or "compromise" by those In opposition, lord 
Aberdeen was restrained In his negotiations not only by Palmerston and the 
Opposition, but by the basic policy that Canning had established, which 
was a policy to refuse to accept anything less than all of the land 
north of the Columbia Elver. It required a great deal of education and 
manipulation on his part before Aberdeen was able to sell his country­
men on the Idea that the Canning boundary was no longer practical. The 
large Influx of Americans Into the Oregon territory made It necessary 
for the British to modify their claims. Even though Aberdeen realized 
this. It was difficult for him to convince others that compromise would 
not represent a capitulation of the national honor of Great Britain and 
In all probability would prevent a war.
The American President, Polk, was faced with a similar situation 
because of national honor. The Democratic Party had won the election 
on the basis of Its promises to reannex Texas and re=occupy the whole 
of Oregon. It could not have been easy for Polk to risk the displeasure 
of his party and much of the nation when he secretly offered the 1:9°
parallel as a compromise boundary In July of 181:̂ , even though the same
120offer had been made three times previously by past American governments.
^^^Prevlous American governments had offered to compromise on 
the b9° parallel In l8l8, 182L, and In 1826.
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Mille neither government considered the Oregon territory to be of par­
ticular value, each had contributed to a situation wherein a retreat 
from its previous position would inevitably be considered a loss of face 
or a sacrifice of national honor. This was most unfortunate as it in 
no way influenced the final decision and nearly brought the two coun­
tries to the brink of war.
The Oregon Treaty of I8I4.6 was unique in one respects both govern­
ments were reasonably well satisfied with the treaty. The treaty was 
well received in Great Britain. Even the new Foreign Minister Palmerston 
had only kind words: **In every quarter It will be learned with entire
satisfaction that the unfortunate differences between this country and 
the United States have been brought to a termination which, as far as 
we can at present judge, seems equally favourable to both parties.”
Queen Victoria took occasion to pay Sir Robert Peel one last compliment, 
when she informed him that, "the settlement of the Oregon question has 
given us the ^eatest satisfaction.
Americans were less satisfied with the treaty. While most Ameri­
cans considered the solution within the national interest, some did not: 
The radical Expansionists who continued to cry iiO® were less than 
satisfied with the final settlement. This group represented only a 
small minority of the population and in no way reflected a majority 
opinion; however, the Expansionists attempted to crucify Polk politic­
ally because they felt that he had unnecessarily conceded American 
lands to Great Britain.
^^%ansard * s Parliamentary Debates (London, l8Ii6), LXXXVII, 10^7.
1 ppChristoper, Victoria's Letters, II, 100.
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The Oregon settlers who lived within misket shot of the Hudson’s 
Bay Company accepted the treaty, but they did so with grave reservations» 
This group did not object so much to the h9̂  parallel as the division 
line, as it did to the Hudson’s Bay Company being allowed to claim owner­
ship to the land it already possessed south of the !i9° parallel» The 
Oregon Spectator made an interesting comment on the treaty on April 1$, 
l8h7, when it was learned in Oregon that the settlement had been made:
England could have eocpacted nothing more» We can say nothing 
for and much against the document. It can never be popular 
with the great bo^y of Americans in Oregon. We shall wait 
anxiously to see how this singular circumstance can be accounted 
for at home, and how this surprising and unconditional surrender 
of right will be justified.123
All groups could not be satisfied with the treaty, but those familiar
with the territory felt that the United States had gained the advantage
because she had received more of the agricultural land, which had the
best climate and the greatest potential for future development.
Other nations were Impressed with the way that the Americans and 
British solved their boundary disputes short of war. The French Minister 
Alphonse Pageat was so Impressed with the way the Americans had dealt 
with the British that he commented on what he considered to be the 
American luck hy reporting the following to his government: "Just to
see, Mr. Minister, how events unroll In this countiy one would say that 
there Is something providential In the success that crowns the enter­
prises of the young republic, for It seems to act more by Instinct of 
its destiny than by serious reflection of Its p o w e r . O t h e r s  must
-^Bancroft, History of Oregon, X X I X 592.
^^^George Vern Blue. "France and the Oregon Question," The Oregon 
Historical Quarterly (1933), XXXIF, l62. Quoted from Pageat’s letter to
Guizot on June 12, 18^6.
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also have believed that the United States had made the better bargain* 
but it should be remembered that even though Great Britain did not re­
ceive as much of the good agricultural land* she did receive -what she 
was most interested in and that was what she considered to be the best 
harbors in the area*
The final settlement of the Oregon dispute represented a great 
moral and financial victory for the pacific policies of Sir Robert Peel’s 
government» Largely* through the efforts of Lord Aberdeen* a possible 
Anglo-American war was avoided and relations between the United States 
and Great Britain once more assumed a more amicable spirit» The ratifi­
cation of the Oregon Treaty removed the last major boundary obstacle 
that might seriously endanger the relations of these two nations in 
future years» The precedent had been firmly established of settling 
all major disputes between the two powers* not by force, but by nego­
tiation.
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